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ABSTRACT 
 
HUNG-CHIA SCOTT HSU: Essays on Venture Capital and Initial Public Offerings  
(Under the direction of Paolo Fulghieri) 
 
 
This thesis consists of two empirical studies concerning the interaction between 
venture financing and the performance of publicly listed firms. Chapter I examines how 
venture capitalists impact the post-issue performance of firms in which they invest. Chapter 
II analyzes the competitive effects of large and new initial public offerings (IPOs) on their 
listed industry competitors, and finds that industry rivals supported by venture capitalists 
gain more competitive advantages.  
More specifically, Chapter I examines the strategic choice of venture capitalists (VCs) 
as “incubators” versus “short-term investors” and the impact of this choice on the 
performance of firms in which they invest. In particular, I study the determinants of the 
length of the venture capital incubation period and its impact on the IPO underpricing and on 
the post-IPO operating performance. I find that VCs play a dual role as “incubators” and as 
“short-term investors”. As short-term investors, VCs decrease the incubation period when the 
stock market valuations are high. As incubators, VCs increase the incubation period of firms 
perceived to be of high risk. With regard to the effect of the VC incubation period, I find that 
firms with a longer incubation period are less underpriced, more likely to survive, and exhibit 
better operating performance after they go public. The results are robust to controlling for the 
selection bias of firms obtaining venture financing.  
 
iii 
Chapter II analyzes the effect of large Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) on publicly 
listed industry competitors.  The chapter provides evidence that companies experience 
negative short term stock price reactions to IPOs in their industry.  Furthermore incumbent 
firms show significant deterioration in their operating performance.  These results are 
consistent with issuing firms having an IPO related competitive advantage over their 
competitors. The chapter identifies potential reasons for this gain in competitiveness: 
certification by venture capitalist and top-tier investment banks, the loosening of financial 
constraints, and the presence of knowledge capital.  Results show that all of these aspects of 
competitiveness are significant in explaining the cross section of underperformance as well 
as survival probabilities for incumbent firms. 
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 Chapter I 
Venture Capital Incubation Period, Underpricing, and Firm Performance 
 “Google’s founders would have preferred to wait longer to do their IPOs, but had to rush it 
because venture capitalists…, wanted to cash in”.1 –The Economists, November 27, 2004 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the strategic choice of venture capitalists (VCs) as 
“incubators” versus “short-term investors” and the impact of this choice on the IPO 
underpricing and on the operating performance of firms following the IPO. While a growing 
literature examines the investment decision of institutional investors (Gompers and Metrick, 
2001) and how the heterogeneity of institutional investors impacts their performance (Lerner, 
Schoar, and Wong, 2006), little is known about how the investment strategy of institutional 
investors affects the performance of firms.2  
This paper fills in the gap by studying the investment strategy of a special class of 
institutional investors, venture capitalists, in a private firm and how this strategy impacts the 
economic development of the firm after it goes public. VCs are a good setting to study the 
influence of institutional investors on firm performance for the following reasons: First, VCs 
hold substantial shares and actively participate in the operation of firms, so their investment
                                                 
1 I thank Paolo Fulghieri and Merih Sevilir for providing this quote from their paper “Size and Focus of a 
Venture Capitalist’s Portfolio”. 
   
2A notable exception is the work by Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) that examine the investment horizon of 
institutional investors and its impact on the market for corporate control. 
 strategies may have a direct impact on firm performance. Second, though VCs represent only 
a small group of institutional investors, a large proportion of IPOs in the recent years were 
backed by VCs.3 Thus, the investment decisions of VCs could have a profound impact 
marketwise. 
Past research has documented that VCs as “incubators” help the professionalization 
of firms (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). On the other hand, VCs are sophisticated investors who 
maximize profits by exiting firms at the “right” time (Lerner, 1994). The Google quote 
mentioned above provides anecdotal evidence that VCs may behave as “short-term 
investors” by rushing firms to go public. The strategic choice of VCs as “incubators” versus 
“short-term investors” thus may affect the market perception of the firm in the IPO stage, its 
survival chance, and operating performance following the IPO.  
In order to test the above conjecture, I first examine whether and under what 
circumstances VCs act as “incubators” versus “short-term investors”. In particular, I study 
factors that determine the length of the VC incubation period, defined as the period starting 
from the first VC investment date to the IPO date of the firm.  I find that the length of the VC 
incubation period decreases with the industry median market-to-book ratios, suggesting that 
VCs as short-term investors time IPOs by taking firms public earlier when market valuations 
are high. On the other hand, VCs spend more time incubating (or monitoring) firms 
perceived to be more risky, i.e. firms in high-tech and highly research-intensive industries. 
Both results support the dual role of VCs as both “incubators” and “short-term investors”.   
In the second stage of the analysis, I examine how the strategic choice of VCs as 
incubators versus short-term investors impacts a firm’s IPO underpricing. The length of the 
                                                 
3 Lerner and Gompers (2003) document that venture-backed IPOs account for 50.33% of all IPOs in 2000 
(P.16). 
2
   
VC incubation period fits the research question well because VCs are extensively involved in 
the business of firms they support. Therefore, the length of time VCs stay in a firm could be 
viewed as a proxy for the magnitude of their effort on the firm.  
Within the sample of venture-backed IPOs, I find that the degree of underpricing 
significantly decreases with the length of the VC incubation period. Furthermore, the age at 
the IPO is a representative measure of the bulk of information the market has about the firm.4 
I find that, for venture-backed firms, the effect of a firm’s age at the IPO on the underpricing 
mainly comes from the incubation period, not from the period before the VC investment. 
Finally, the difference in underpricing between venture-backed and matching non-venture-
backed IPOs decreases with the length of the VC incubation period. These findings are 
robust after controlling for the potential selection bias of venture financing. These results 
seem to suggest that firms with longer VC participation suffer less value reduction due to the 
information asymmetry at the IPO stage.  
Finally, as a further test of the effect of the VC incubation period, I find that firms 
with a longer incubation period are more likely to survive and have a higher level of post-
issue ROAs. The results are also robust to controlling for the selection bias of venture 
financing. The findings suggest that firms with longer VC investment have a more 
competitive advantage and are faster to mature. These findings are consistent with Hellman 
and Puri (2002) who find that “the effects venture capitalists have on their companies are 
strongest precisely at the earlier stages when companies are not publicly traded” (P.171-172).  
The above findings shed light on how the internal conflict of VCs impacts the 
governance and performance of entrepreneurial firms. The conflict originates from the VC’s 
                                                 
4 Both Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) and Ritter (1991) document a negative relation between age and 
aftermarket performance. 
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choice between the long-term and short-term investment strategies. The results suggest that 
the trade-offs implicit in the VC’s choice of long-term versus short-term strategies affect the 
survival and performance of entrepreneurial firms. In particular, when market valuations are 
high, VCs act as “short-term investors” by shortening the incubation period and “rush” firms 
into the IPO stage, leading to a higher underpricing. In addition, a shorter incubation period 
means less VC effort, which leads to less chance of survival and worse operating 
performance after the IPOs.  
The findings further provide an alternative way of examining the effect of VCs on 
firms. Most studies in this vein focus on the “existence” of the venture backing effect by 
conducting a binary comparison between venture-backed and non-venture-backed firms.5 For 
example, Lee and Wahal (2004) document that, after controlling for the selection bias of 
venture backing, venture-backed IPOs are more underpriced than their non-venture-backed 
counterparts. Their result suggests that the existence of venture backing does not reduce the 
degree of underpricing. In contrast, this paper suggests that the “magnitude” of the venture 
backing effect matters: A longer incubation is associated with a smaller IPO underpricing.  
The paper also contributes to the literature that predicts the timing of the going public 
decision. For example, I find that the length of the VC incubation period decreases with 
industry capital intensity while controlling for the cost of information production, as 
predicted by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999). In addition, the length of the VC incubation 
period increases with industry competition, suggesting that competition and concerns for the 
loss of confidentiality delay the IPO decision since public firms are subject to more 
information disclosure (Campbell, 1979; Yosha, 1995; Pagano et al., 1998). Finally, the 
                                                 
5 Barry et al. (1990), and Megginson and Weiss (1991) compare the IPO underpricing between venture-backed 
and non-venture-backed IPOs. Jain and Kini (1995) and Wang et al. (2003) document the difference in 
operating performance between venture-backed and non-venture-backed IPOs. 
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length of the VC incubation period decreases with the experience of the lead VC firm, 
suggesting the “learning” effects of VCs in incubating firms.  
For related literature that discusses the investment duration of institutional investors, 
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) investigate how the investment horizon of a firm’s 
institutional shareholders impacts the market for corporate control. Cumming and McIntosh 
(2001) compare the venture capital investment duration of firms in U.S and in Canada and 
find that VCs stay longer in early-stage firms. Napier et al. (2001) study 133 venture-backed 
firms that went public in the second half of 1999 and find that the incubation period is 
positively associated with post-IPO stock market returns. Finally, Wang et al. (2003) study 
92 Singaporean firms that went public from 1987 to 2001 and find that long venture-backed 
firms (firms backed by VCs for more than two years) exhibit inferior operating performance 
than their non-venture-backed counterparts.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes factors that 
determine the length of the VC incubation period and its impact on firms at the IPO stage and 
after the IPO. Section 3 describes the empirical hypotheses in this paper. Section 4 describes 
the data and sample. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 describes the robustness check, 
and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This section reviews literature that documents (1) factors that determine the length of 
the VC incubation period (2) Potential aspects the length of the VC incubation period may 
impact firms. 
2.1. The Determinants of the length of VC Incubation Period  
5
   
2.1.1. Market Timing and Industry Prospects 
Stock market overvaluation in a certain industries could trigger firms in the same 
industry to go public within a short period to take advantage of this “window of opportunity”. 
As sophisticated investors, VCs are repeated participants in the IPO market and are so 
influential in the firm’s decision making process. 6  Thus, they are better aware of the 
opportunity and are able to takes firms public at market peaks, as documented by Lerner 
(1994). Moreover, Miccelacci and Suarez (2004) show that, in an industry where a positive 
productivity shock occurs, more startups appear and compete for financing and expertise 
from VCs. The increasing demand for venture financing raises the rents extracted by VCs 
and thus leads more startups to go public earlier. Both findings suggest that VC incubation 
period decreases with stock market valuation.                
2.1.2. Information Asymmetry and the Need of Monitoring 
Venture-backed firms are typically early-stage ventures with high uncertainties. 
Therefore, effective monitoring from VCs is critical for the success of these ventures. 
Gompers (1995) documents the staging of capital infusions as an effective monitoring 
mechanism. Lerner (1995) finds that the representation of VCs on the boards of directors 
increases around the time of CEO turnover. All the above literature provides evidence of 
VCs as “incubators”. Recently, Cumming and McIntosh (2001) show that the VC investment 
duration increases with firms that are in the early stage of their life cycle. Thus, VCs could 
spend more time incubating and monitoring firms perceived to be more risky.  
2.1.3. Capital Intensity and Cost of Information Production 
                                                 
6 Barry at al. (1990) and Sahlman (1990) document that venture investors usually have several board seats and 
control rights to put their shares to the firm’s management. 
6
   
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) propose a theory in which the entrepreneur of a 
private firm, who seeks financing either publicly (by selling shares in IPO) or privately 
(through venture capitalists), has the informational advantage over outside investors. They 
provide predictions on the timing of IPOs for venture-backed firms. If two industries have 
the same difficulty in evaluating projects, firms in the more capital intensive industry will go 
public earlier to reduce higher risk premium demanded by the VC. On the other hand, if two 
industries have the same capital intensities, firms in the industry where projects are more 
difficult to evaluate due to technology sophistication will go public later to minimize the cost 
of information production demanded by outsiders. Therefore, the VC incubation period 
decreases with industry capital intensity and increases with the difficulty in project 
evaluation.  
2.1.4. Industry Competition and Loss of Confidentiality 
One of the disadvantages of going public is the disclosure requirements from stock 
exchanges that force firms to unveil information crucial for the competitive advantage of 
firms. Therefore, concerns for the loss of confidentiality deter firms from going public 
(Campbell, 1979; Yosha, 1995; Pagano et al., 1998). Since most venture-backed firms are 
highly technological-oriented, the loss of confidentiality is of particular concern. Maksimovic 
and Pichler (2001) consider early IPOs as a means of informing potential competitors of the 
viability of the industry. If the market competition is fierce, the concern for loss of 
confidentiality increases and thus delays the firm’s decision to go public. Thus, VC 
incubation period increases with industry competition.        
2.1.5. VC Characteristics and Firm Stage 
7
   
The attributes of VCs could also impact the time they devote to firms they support. 
Gompers (1996) proposes a “grandstanding” hypothesis in which young VC firms have 
incentives to signal their qualities by taking firms public earlier. The grandstanding 
hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between the age of VC and the incubation period. 
On the other hand, older VCs are more experienced and are more adept at the incubating 
process. Thus, the “learning effect” of VCs could reduce the incubation period. 
2.2. The Effect of the Length of VC Incubation Period 
2.2.1. The Effect of the VC Incubation Period in the IPO Stage 
Most literature that studies the role of VCs in the IPO stage compares the difference, 
particularly the degree of underpricing, between venture-backed and non-venture-backed 
IPOs. Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that venture-backed IPOs are less underpriced than 
non-venture-backed IPOs and refer to the findings as the “certification” roles of VCs. 
However, Lee and Wahal (2004) correct for the selection bias of venture financing and find 
that venture-backed IPOs are more underpriced. The arguments that VCs certify IPOs is also 
challenged by the recent findings that underpricing increases with the reputation of 
underwriters7 since VCs as repetitive IPO market participants build better ties with reputable 
underwriters.8  
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) find that large-scaled underpricing during the dom-
com bubble is negatively correlated with pre-IPO VC ownership. Their finding suggests the 
degree of VC participation in terms of the ownership may reduce the level of underpricing. 
Similarly, if a longer incubation period suggests more VC participation in the firm, we 
                                                 
7 Loughran and Ritter (2004) have a detailed discussion on this finding. 
 
8 Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that venture-backed IPOs were underwritten by better investment banks. 
8
   
should also expect a negative relationship between the length of the incubation period and the 
degree of underpricing.           
2.2.2. The Effect of the VC Incubation Period following the IPO  
VCs are highly specialized investors who provide entrepreneurial firms with business 
expertise. Hellman and Puri (2002) find that VCs accelerate the professionalization of firm. 
Therefore, after going public, firms with longer VC participation could be more likely to 
survive in competing with their industry incumbents and exhibit better operating 
performance. The findings of Jain and Kini (1995) that venture-backed IPOs demonstrate 
relatively superior operating improvements supports this conjecture.  
 
3. Hypotheses  
 Based on the predictions discussed in the previous section about the determinants of 
the length of VC incubation period and its impact, I summarize the following hypotheses: 
H1: (Market timing) The length of the VC incubation period decreases with the stock 
market valuation and industry growth potential. 
This paper uses industry median market-to-book ratio to measure both the window of 
opportunities in the stock market and the industry growth potential. 
H2: (Information asymmetry and monitoring) The length of the VC incubation period 
is longer for firms in the high-tech and highly research-intensive industries. 
This paper measures the degree of information asymmetry using the industry median 
research intensity (defined as the ratio of R&D expenses over sales) and a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm is in high-tech industries based on the definition of Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). 
9
   
H3: (Capital Intensity and Cost of Information Production) The length of the VC 
incubation period decreases with industry capital intensity and increases with the cost 
of information production. 
This paper uses industry median research intensity to proxy for the cost of 
information production because firms in highly research intensive industries are more 
difficult to evaluate and thus the cost of information production is higher. I employ the ratio 
of capital expenditure over total asset to proxy for capital intensity. 
H4: (Industry Competition and Loss of Confidentiality) The length of the VC 
incubation period increases with industry competition.  
This paper employs the Herfindahl index as a reverse measure of the degree of 
industry competition. 
H5a: (Grandstanding) The length of the VC incubation period increases with the age of 
the lead VC firm. 
H5b: (Learning effect) VC incubation period decreases with the age of the lead VC firm 
and decreases if the firm’s industry matches with the lead VC’s specialization. 
 VCs often syndicate their investments with other VCs, and the lead VC usually has 
the significant control over the decisions regarding the investment. I identify the lead VC as 
the one who has the largest investment in the firm across all rounds.9 If there are two VCs 
that meet these criteria, the one with higher capital under management is selected as the lead 
VC. I then use the age of the lead VC in the first round of financing as a measure of 
experience. 
 
                                                 
9 VC related literature has different definitions of the lead VC. Gompers (1996) identifies the lead VC as the 
firm that has been on the board the longest; Barry et al. (1990) classify the lead VC as the one that owns the 
largest equity stake and has a board seat. This definition of this paper is the same as in Lee and Wahal (2004).  
10
   
H6: IPO underpricing decreases with the length of the VC incubation period. 
H7: Firms with longer incubation period are more likely to survive and have better 
operating performance after they go public. 
 
4. Data and Sample 
4.1. Data Sources 
The data used in this paper come from the following sources: First, financing 
information of venture-backed firms, such as the name, the number of financing rounds, and 
the date of each financing round, mainly comes from the SDC Venture Xpert Database. 
Information on VC investors, such as the identity, industry preferences, and the cumulative 
amount of investment, also comes from the SDC Venture Xpert Database. The accounting 
information of venture-backed firms comes from Compustat. Since most pre-IPO accounting 
information is unavailable in Compustat, I calculate annual four-digit SIC code industry 
medians instead. Information on IPOs, such as the IPO date, IPO size, IPO price, book 
runners, number of primary and secondary shares, comes primarily from the SDC New 
Issues Database. I verify the IPO dates with both CRSP and data provided by Jay Ritter.10 
Carter-Manaster (1990) underwriter ranking data are from Jay Ritter. Finally, Firms’ 
delisting information, including the delisting date and reasons, is from CRSP.                    
4.2. Sample 
The original sample consists of 2678 venture-backed IPOs in the SDC Venture Xpert 
Database that went public between 1980 and 2004. I excluded the sample before 1980 due to 
the amendment of the “prudent man” rule in 1979 which led to a structural change in the 
                                                 
10 This dataset contains the founding dates, CRSP permanent IDs, the first day of trading on CRSP, and the 
company names for 7,379 firms that went public in the U.S. during 1975-2003 and were subsequently listed on 
CRSP. 
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venture capital industry because pension funds were allowed to invest in venture capital 
firms. I require firms in my sample be identified in both CRSP and Compustat. In the 
following analysis, I also exclude best effort offers, ADRs (American Depository Receipts), 
closed-end funds, REITs (real estate investment trusts), and IPOs with an offer price below 
$5.00 per share.  
Some data errors were found in the Venture Xpert Database. For example, the 
founding date of VC funds are later than the first VC financing round date of their venture-
backed firms, or the founding date of the venture-backed firms is later than the IPO date. I 
exclude observations with such data errors. I also exclude firms in regulated industries 
defined in Barclay and Smith (1995). Finally, I exclude firms whose stage is 
“Buyout/Acquisitions” because VCs investing in firms within this category may have 
different objectives and thus including these observations may bias the results.11 The final 
sample consists of 1502 firms.  
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the main variables. The mean and the 
median VC incubation period are 4.02 years and 3.28 years and account for about 50 to 55 
percent of firm age at the IPO (7.92 years in mean and 6 years in median). The mean industry 
median market-to-book ratio prior to the IPO is 2.93, suggesting that venture-backed firms 
are typically characterized by high-growth. 
Table 2A takes a closer look at the distribution of the VC incubation period and the 
amount of VC investments in a firm based on different periods in which firms go public. 
Table 2A shows an increase of VC investments in a firm over time, starting from an average 
of 18.57 million in the 80’s to a mean of 77.88 million in the post-bubble period.  The 
                                                 
11 As a robustness check, I include the observations and do the same analysis. Not surprisingly, the mean 
incubation period decreases. However, the inclusion of these observations does not change the results of the 
analysis.     
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increasing pattern of VC investments over time reflects a snapshot of the growth of the 
venture capital industry. On the other hand, the mean incubation period first increases from 
3.37 years in the 80’s to 4.58 years in the period from 1991 to 1998. The mean incubation 
period then drops to 3.38 years during the bubble period, but again hikes to 5.03 years in the 
post-bubble period. The sudden drop in mean VC incubation period corresponds to the 
booming in the stock market and the IPO waves of high-tech firms during the bubble period. 
This finding seems to support the market timing hypothesis in that VCs shorten the 
incubation period when the stock market booms. 
Table 2B reports the distribution of VC incubation period and the amount of 
investments by industry. Most firms in the sample cluster in the “high-tech” industries, such 
as Computers (43% of total sample), Instruments and Electrical Equipments (a combined 
16.85% of total sample), and Pharmaceuticals (12.52%). A comparison of the mean 
incubation period across all industries suggest that VCs seem to stay relatively longer in 
these “high-tech”12 and highly research-intensive industries such as Instruments, Electrical 
Equipment, Machinery, and Pharmaceuticals. Though this finding seems to support the role 
of VCs as “incubators”, the shorter incubation period in the Computers industry (3.92 years 
on average) leaves room for other explanations as well. Finally, table 2B suggests no positive 
relationship between the length of the incubation period and the amount of VC investment 
per firm on the industry level.  
                    
5. Empirical Tests and Results 
5.1. The Determinants of the VC Incubation Period 
                                                 
12 Appendix B has a detailed definition of industry classification used in table 2B. According to the definition in 
appendix D of Ritter and Loughran (2004), Instruments, Electrical Equipment, Machinery, Transportation, and 
Computers are classified as technology industries.      
13
   
In this section, I employ the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method to test 
the determinants of the length of the VC incubation period described in Section 2. One of the 
advantages of using OLS is that it is straightforward to interpret the economic magnitude of 
OLS estimators.13  I complement the analysis by using the survival analysis method (or 
duration analysis method) as a robustness check.  
Table 3 reports the regression results.14 VC incubation period decreases with the 
industry median market-to-book ratio, and the effect is significant at 1 percent level across all 
specifications. This result confirms the market timing hypothesis (H1) and suggests that VCs 
as short-term investors time IPOs by taking firms public when stock market valuations are 
high (Lerner, 1994). 
On the other hand, the incubation period is positively associated with the industry 
median research intensity, though only significant at 10 percent level. In addition, the 
incubation period is longer for high-tech firms. In terms of the economic magnitude, the 
incubation period increases by half a year for high-tech firms. Collectively, both findings 
support the need of monitoring hypothesis (H2) and suggest that VCs stay longer in firms 
perceived to be more risky. These results, together with the findings that VC incubation 
period increases with early-stage firms, suggest the VCs do play the role as “incubators” in 
some cases. 
Table 3 also shows that the incubation period decreases significantly with industry 
median capital intensity. The negative coefficient of the capital intensity, along with the 
                                                 
13 Gompers (1996) uses OLS estimation to investigate the relationship between age of the lead venture firm and 
the duration from IPO to the time when the firm raises its next fund. 
 
14 The industry median numbers in the regression are calculated one fiscal year before the IPO. As a robustness 
check, I also regress industry median number the year and one year after the first VC investment on VC 
incubation period. The results remain the same.    
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positive coefficient on the research intensity, support the hypothesis predicted by 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) that the IPO timing is simultaneously determined by 
industry capital intensity and the cost of information production. 
With regard to the loss of confidentiality hypothesis, this paper finds that the 
incubation period significantly decreases with the Herfindahl index of industry competition 
in some specifications. It is worth noticing that whenever the industry median capital 
intensity is dropped, the coefficient of Herfindahl index becomes significant. This is because 
firms that exhibit higher capital intensities are more likely in industries with less competition. 
Overall, the negative sign on the coefficient of the Herfindhal index supports the loss of 
confidentiality hypothesis.  
Finally, the incubation period decreases by about 5 months when the lead VC is more 
than four years old.15 This result seems to be the opposite of the findings of Gompers (1996) 
and supports the learning hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the result poses a 
challenge to the grandstanding hypothesis proposed by Gompers (1996): First, the sample 
period of Gompers (1996) ranges from 1978 to 1987 whereas the sample period of this paper 
starts from 1980 to 2003. It is possible that the objective function of VCs change over time, 
especially during the bubble period when the stock market exhibited exuberance. Second, the 
measure of the lead VC is different from that in Gompers (1996) and thus might lead to 
different estimation results. It takes further steps to probe on this issue. Nevertheless, the 
result seems to support the learning hypothesis in which more experienced VCs tend to 
shorten the incubation period.                      
5.2. VC Incubation Period and the IPO Underpricing  
5.2.1. VC Incubation Period and IPO Underpricing within Venture-Backed IPOs 
                                                 
15 I try different cutoff value of the age of the lead VC as the VC experience dummy, and the result still holds.  
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In the analysis, I use the natural log of the length of the VC incubation period as the 
main explanatory variable because data suggest that the incubation period is dispersed, 
ranging from 0 to 20 years. The use of the natural log of the incubation period also shows a 
better fit of the model. To control for the potential “age” effect before VC participation, I 
include the natural log of firm age at the first VC financing round.16 The model is the 
following: 
iblesOtherVariaavestAgeFirstInLnaVCIPLnaangUnderprici ε++++= 3210 )()(  
Where Ln(VCIP) is the natural log of the VC incubation period and Ln(AgeFirstInvest) 
is the natural log of firm age at the first VC financing round.  
Other controlling variables include the Carter-Manaster (1990) underwriter ranking, 
share overhang defined as the ratio of retained shares to the public floats17, the natural log of 
the firm sales and assets prior to IPOs, a high-tech dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in the 
high-tech industries defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004) and zero otherwise, and a bubble 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm went public in 1999 and in 2000 and zero other wise. Finally, in 
order to control for the endogeneity problem of VC incubation period, I include industry 
median market-to-book ratio, industry median research intensity, Herfindahl index of 
industry concentration, the early stage dummy, and the middle stage dummy. I also include 
the VC experience dummy and the dummy of whether VC’s industry preference fits the firm.  
Table 4 reports the results. A longer incubation period is associated with lower 
underpricing and the result is statistically significant in all specifications. It is worth noticing 
that firm age at the first VC financing date is not significant or only significant at 10 percent 
                                                 
16 I run a simple correlation analysis between the incubation period and firm age at the first VC financing round 
and find that the correlation coefficient is -0.07, suggesting no correlation between these two variables. In 
addition, the correlation coefficient between the incubation period and firm age at IPO is 0.3.  
 
17 Share overhang is a measure of the opportunity cost of underpricing. Please see Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
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level, suggesting the effect of firm age at the IPO on the initial returns mainly comes from 
the effect of VC incubation period. The findings confirm the hypothesis that a longer VC 
participation reduces firm uncertainty in the IPO market. Consistent with the finding of 
Loughran and Ritter (2004), the degree of underpricing increases with the underwriter 
ranking. In addition, the higher the share overhang, the lower the opportunity cost of 
underpricing and thus the greater the underpricing. Finally, firms that went public during the 
bubble period were heavily underpriced by 67 percent on average. The magnitude is similar 
to the documented underpricing for venture-backed IPOs during the bubble period. 
5.2.2. VC Incubation Period and Differences in Underpricing between Venture-
Backed and Non-Venture-Backed Firms 
  
Lee and Wahal (2004) control for the selection bias of venture financing and find that 
venture-backed IPOs are more underpriced than their nonventure counterparts. However, it is 
unclear what factors explain the “magnitude” of the difference in initial returns. Since their 
analysis controls for factors that predetermine venture backing, a reasonable conjecture is 
that VC-specific factors contributes to this difference. Based on the previous result that initial 
returns decrease with VC incubation period, it is possible that the difference in underpricing 
decreases with the VC incubation period as well.    
To test this hypothesis, it is important to find a “good” match that controls for the 
difference in nature between venture-backed and non-venture-backed IPOs. This paper 
follows Lee and Wahal (2004) by using the propensity score to find the “best” match 
between the venture-backed and non-venture-backed IPOs. The propensity score method also 
eliminates the selection bias because it controls for a set of variables that predetermine the 
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choice of venture financing.18 I take the difference in underpricing from each “matched” pair, 
and then regress the “matched” differences in underpricing on a set of VC-specific 
explanatory variables such as underwriter ranking, share overhang, firm size, and variables 
that determine the length of the VC incubation period. The model is the following: 
iblesOtherVariaavestAgeFirstInLnaVCIPLnaangUnderprici ε++++=∆ 3210 )()(  
Where ∆Underpricing is the “matched” difference in underpricing between venture-
backed and non-venture-backed IPOs. Consistent with the finding of Lee and Wahal (2004), 
I find that venture-backed IPOs are more underpriced than their non-venture-backed 
counterpart after implementing the propensity score methods. Table 5 reports the regression 
result. A higher incubation period is associated with lower difference in initial returns, 
suggesting a greater impact of the length of the incubation period on the difference in 
underpricing. 
Another interpretation of the results in Table 5 is to view the difference in initial 
returns as the “adjusted” underpricing for venture-backed IPOs in the sense that this measure 
excludes the portion of underpricing that is explained by common factors affecting both the 
venture-backed and non-venture-backed IPOs. Therefore, the “adjusted” underpricing is a 
purer measure for venture-backed IPOs. It is not surprising that there is a strong relationship 
between the incubation period and the “adjusted” underpricing of venture-backed IPOs.  
Overall, this result suggests that the length of the VC incubation period helps explain 
cross-sectional underpricing for venture-backed IPOs. In addition, the effect of firm age at 
IPO on initial returns mainly comes from the effect of VC incubation period.                    
 
                                                 
18 Please see Lee and Wahal (2004) for detailed description of using the propensity score method to correct the 
selection bias of venture financing. 
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5.3. VC Incubation Period and the Survival of Firms after the IPO 
Table 6A compares the length of the VC incubation period between firms that survive 
after they go public and firms that don’t. A firm is defined as non-surviving if it is delisted 
within three years after the IPO date for reasons other than mergers. The surviving firms have, 
on average, a half year longer incubation period than non-surviving firms. The difference is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
 It is possible that the above result is driven by the “natural maturation” effect that 
older firms are more likely to survive. In order to distinguish the effect of venture backing 
from the natural maturation effect, I compare the age at the first VC investment date as well 
as the age at IPO between surviving and non-surviving firms. Although the results show that 
surviving firms have longer pre-VC participation history and are older at the IPO date, the 
differences are not statistically significant or marginally significant.  
 In order to further investigate the effect of the VC incubation period on the survival 
of firms after the IPO, I conduct a probit regression in Table 6B. The model is structured as 
the following: 
iblesOtherVariaavestAgeFirstInaVCIPaaSurvive ε++++= 3210  
Where Survive is equal to 1 if the firm is not delisted within three years after the IPO 
date or it is delisted for reasons of mergers. In addition to the VC incubation period as the 
main independent variable, other controlling variables include firm age at first VC 
investment date, natural log of firm asset one year before the IPO, natural log of IPO offer 
size, underwriter ranking, high-tech and bubble dummy. The VC incubation period has a 
positive and significant impact on the survival probability with and without variables that 
determine the incubation period (Model 1 and Model 3). Furthermore, Firm age at the IPO 
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date doesn’t have a significant impact on the survival of firms after the IPO, nor does the 
firm age at the first VC investment date. In summary, both the univariate and multivariate 
analyses suggest that firms with longer incubation period have better competitive advantage 
after they go public, and this result is not driven by the “natural maturation” effect of firms.  
5.4. VC Incubation Period and the Post-IPO Operating Performance 
This section investigates how the magnitude of VC participation impacts firms’ post-
IPO operating performance. Table 7 presents the regression result with the Level of ROA as 
the dependent variable and the natural log of VC incubation period as the main independent 
variable. The model is the following: 
iblesOtherVariaavestAgeFirstInLnaVCIPLnaaROA ε++++= 3210 )()(  
Other independent variables include the natural log of firm age at the first VC 
investment date, the fraction of the firm retained by insiders at the IPO19, the natural log of 
IPO offer size, a high-tech dummy, a bubble dummy, and variables that determine the length 
of the incubation period. The level of ROA from the IPO year to three years after the IPO 
significantly increases with the incubation period and with firm age at first VC financing 
round, but the magnitude of VC incubation period is slightly stronger in the first two years. 
 In summary, a longer VC incubation period is associated with a high level of ROAs 
after the IPO, suggesting that VCs as “incubators” create firm value. Furthermore, it seems 
that this “performance-enhancing” effect by VCs is less persistent since the positive effect on 
the level of ROAs dwindles two years after the IPO.  
 
6. Robustness Checks 
                                                 
19 Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest higher ownership retention signals higher value of the firm. 
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6.1. The Effect of VC Participation or Natural Maturation 
One fundamental issue in this paper is the justification of the use of the VC 
incubation period as a proxy for the “magnitude” of VC effort. It is possible that the effect of 
the incubation period is just a reflection of aging of firms, not the effect of VC participation. 
An ideal way to disentangle the two effects is to find a comparable measure of the length of 
the VC incubation period on the non-venture-backed IPOs and test whether the “incubation 
period” effect is greater in venture-backed IPOs. In reality, since it is difficult to find such 
measure, an alternative way is to test whether the “age effect” at IPOs is greater for venture-
backed IPOs. This paper proposes the following model: 
iblesOtherVariaaIPOAGELnVCaIPOAGELnaVCaaROA ε+++++= 43210 )(*)(  
Where ROA is the post-issue return on asset, VC takes the value of 1 if the firm is venture-
backed and zero otherwise, Ln(IPOAGE) is the natural log of firm age at IPO, 
VC*Ln(IPOAGE) is the interaction of both variables. Other explanatory variables include 
underwriter ranking, natural log of proceeds the firm receives at IPO, high-tech dummies and 
bubble dummies.   
Table 8 reports the regression results on the level of ROAs. Firm age at the IPO has a 
positive impact on the level of ROAs. Venture-backed IPOs have a lower level of post-IPO 
ROAs. Most importantly, the interaction term of the VC dummy and firm age at IPO is 
positive and significant in all specifications, suggesting that the “age effect” at the IPO is 
more pronounced for venture-backed IPOs even after controlling for the IPO size and growth 
opportunities. This result suggests that the effect of VC incubation period is not a 
consequence of natural maturation, but to some extent reflects the effect of venture-backing. 
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This finding also suggests that VCs speed up the maturation of firms and are consistent with 
Hellman and Puri (2002) that firms that obtain venture funding are faster to professionalize.  
6.2. A Survival Analysis of the Determinants of the length of VC Incubation Period 
In the econometrics literature, a standard way of dealing with duration data is to 
employ the survival analysis (also called duration analysis or hazard model)20, in which a 
hazard function is specified and is conditioned on some explanatory variables. In the context 
of this paper, a firm is assumed to have a certain probability of going public. Then the hazard 
rate is defined as the probability that the firm goes public between time t and t∆ divided by 
the probability that the firm goes public after t. Depending on distributional assumptions, 
there are mainly two types of hazard rate models: Parametric models (such as Weibull) and 
semi-parametric models (such as Cox proportional hazard model). Survival analysis is also 
able to deal with left or right censored data. Since this study does not restrict a cutoff date of 
the first VC investment, there is no censored data issue throughout the analysis. Survival 
analysis can also deal with time-dependent explanatory variables, so I employ both the 
Weibull model with time-invariant covariates and the Cox proportional model with time-
varying covariates in the analysis. 
Table 9 reports the results on both the Weibull distribution model and the Cox 
proportional model. In the Weibull model, the dependent variable is the natural log of VC 
incubation period, and the interpretation of coefficients is straightforward: positive 
coefficients imply longer expected incubation period and negative coefficients imply shorter 
incubation period on average. On the contrary, in the Cox proportional model, the dependent 
variable is the incubation period, but the interpretation of coefficients is reversed: positive 
                                                 
20 Please see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) and Kiefer (1988) for a review. There has been extensive use 
survival analysis in the Finance literature in dealing with duration data. See Gompers (1995), Cumming and 
McIntosh (2001) and Hellman and Puri (2002).    
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coefficients increase the likelihood that the firm goes public and thus decrease expected 
incubation period. Therefore, we should expect the opposite sign from the same variable in 
these two models.  
Consistent with results on the OLS regression, the increase in industry median 
market-to-book ratio reduces the incubation period under the Weibull model, and increases 
the likelihood that the firm goes public under the Cox proportional model. The effect is again 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. VC incubation period increases with industry 
median research intensity, but the result is insignificant. The Herfindhal index has negative 
effect on the incubation period and supports the loss of confidentiality hypothesis. All other 
explanatory variables have the same effects on the incubation period with similar 
significance levels as those in the OLS regression.       
6.3. VC Incubation Period on IPO Underpricing: Heckman’s Two-Step Procedures 
It is possible that the results on the effects of VC incubation period are biased because 
VCs endogenously “select” firms in a non-random fashion. In this section, I employ the 
standard Heckman’s two-step procedures to address the selection bias of venture financing. 
The equation estimated in the first step is a probit model where VC backing is the dependent 
variable and the independent variables include the firms’ industry dummies, firms’ state 
dummies, firms’ IPO year dummies, whether firms were founded after 1980, natural log of 
net proceeds, and underwriter ranking.21 Lee and Wahal (2004) mention that the natural log 
of net proceeds and underwriter ranking are known only at the time of the IPO and thus don’t 
qualify as “ex ante” variables that determine VC financing. However, they think both 
variables are correlated with other ex ante but unobservable predictors. To make sure the 
                                                 
21 The first step estimation in Heckman’s procedure is very similar to the first step estimation of propensity 
score matching. The only difference is that I use the logit regression in propensity score estimation and use the 
probit in Heckman.   
23
   
selection of explanatory variables does not biase the estimation, I run the first-step regression 
with and without natural log of net proceeds and underwriter ranking, and the results remain 
unaffected. If VC backing =1, the second-step regression estimates the IPO underpricing on 
the natural log of VC incubation period, other controlling variables as appeared in table 3, 
and the inverse Mills ratio obtained in the first-step estimation. The model is the following: 
iii ZaaVC ε++= 10*                                                         
1=iVC if 0* >iVC and 0=iVC if 0* <iVC   
If 1=iVC then iii XbPeriodIncubationLnbbngUnderprici η+++= 210 )(  
Where iZ are variables that determine the choice of venture-backing and iX are other 
variables that explain the level of underpricing. The error terms ( iε , iη ) are assumed to 
follow a multivariate normal distribution. 
Table 10 presents the result. The coefficients of VC incubation period are still 
negative and statistically significant in all specifications. The effect of VC incubation period 
is more pronounced when variables that determine the incubation period are included. Thus, 
the results of the Heckman’s two step procedures again support the role of VCs in reducing 
the information asymmetry in the IPO market. 
 
6.4. VC Incubation Period and Post-IPO Operating Performance: Heckman’s Two- 
Step Procedures 
 
The potential self-selection problem could also bias the estimation of the effect of VC 
incubation period on firms’ post-IPO operating performance, so I employ the Heckman’s two 
step procedures again. The model is identical to that specified in Section 5.3 except that in 
the second step, the dependent variable is the ROA. Variables in the selection model include 
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firms’ industry dummies, firms’ state dummies, firms’ IPO year dummies, whether firms 
were founded after 1980, and underwriter ranking. Table 11 presents the results. VC 
incubation period still has a positively impact on the level of post-issue ROAs. The 
magnitude and the significance are similar to the results in table 5 except for the insignificant 
result on level of ROA three years after the IPO, suggesting again a less persistent effect of 
VC participation under the Heckman’s two-step procedures.  
   
7. Conclusion                  
This paper first studies the determinants of the length of the VC incubation period and 
investigates whether and under what circumstances VCs act as “incubators” versus “short-
term investors”. In particular, this paper finds evidence that VCs time IPOs by shortening the 
incubation period when the stock market conditions are good. On the other hand, VCs spend 
more time in incubating firms perceived to be more risky. This paper then goes on to study 
the effects of the VC incubation period. Within the venture-backed firms, longer incubation 
period is associated with lower underpricing, and the effect of firm age at IPOs on 
underpricing is mainly attributed to the incubation period, not the period before VC 
participation. Moreover, VC incubation period decreases with the difference in underpricing 
between venture-backed and non-venture-backed IPOs. Finally, firms with longer incubation 
period are more likely to survive, demonstrate a higher level but less improvement of post-
issue operating performance.  
The findings shed light on the internal conflict of VCs in monitoring startups and its 
impact on the economic development of firms. In this paper, the conflict originates from the 
long-term or short-term investment strategies that VCs can choose. Nevertheless, there are 
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limitations of this paper. First, this paper finds that experienced VCs shorten the incubation 
period, a result seemingly contradicted to the grandstanding hypothesis proposed by 
Gompers (1996). However, this paper does not answer why the “learning” effect dominates 
the grandstanding motive, and needs further investigation on this issue. It is also unclear 
whether VCs suffer from the consequences of lower VC participation, such as higher 
underpricing and worse operating performance. Gompers (1996)’s grandstanding hypothesis 
suggests that high underpricing is the cost for VCs to grandstand in order to facilitate future 
funding. This paper suggests that VCs benefit from taking firms public at market peaks at the 
cost of high underpricing due to the short history of venture backing. However, with such 
myopic exiting strategy, VCs might lose their reputation in the long run. It is thus important 
to study VCs’ post-issue behavior and relate it to the degree of pre-IPO VC participation.  
Finally, when we investigate the effect of the VC incubation period, one potential 
econometric issue arises in that VCs endogenously choose the length of the incubation period. 
One way that addresses this issue is to employ the two-stage least squares, i.e. to find valid 
instrumental variables in the first stage and used these variables to proxy for the length of the 
incubation period. To address the endogeneity problem of the VC incubation period, I 
include variables that determine the incubation period in the “second stage” regression in the 
following analysis. Such treatment helps reduce the omitted variable problem at the expense 
of multicollinearity problem in which explanatory variables could be linearly correlated (the 
incubation period and its determinants). I run different multicollinearity tests to make sure 
there is no severe concern for multicollinearity. Ideally, The use of instrumental variable 
(two-stage least squares estimation) is a better method of controlling for the endogeneity 
problem. However, it is hard to find “good” instrumental variables in this paper because 
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variables that determine the length of VC incubation period, such as market-to-book ratios, 
could be correlated with the post-IPO outcomes. More researches are called for to further 
investigate this issue.          
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 Chapter II 
The New Game in Town: Competitive Effects of IPOs 
 
1. Introduction 
An extensive literature analyzes the performance of companies around their Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs).  This literature focuses on returns on the first day of trading, as well as 
returns and operating performance for a five year period after the IPO.  Ibbotson (1975) is 
among the first to document the positive initial return for newly issued companies.  Ritter 
(1991) analyzes the long run stock price performance of IPOs, while Jain and Kini (1994) 
consider the post IPO operating performance.  But so far there has been little evidence on 
how the IPO of a company affects the performance of competing companies in the same 
industry as the issuing firm.  This paper closes the apparent gap by considering the returns 
and operating performance of companies around a large IPO in their industry.  The results are 
consistent with an intuitive story: issuing firms have competitive advantages over their 
publicly traded industry peers which are related to the IPO itself.   
This paper has two goals.  The first goal is to document the underperformance of 
publicly traded incumbent firms around IPOs in their industries. This paper shows that 
industry competitors experience negative stock price returns around IPOs and show 
significant deterioration in their operating performance after the IPOs.  The second goal is to 
explain the underperformance by describing how cross-sectional differences in performance 
and the probability of survival are related to firm competitiveness.  The paper identifies 
 several possible determinants of the competitive effect of IPOs on their industry incumbents.  
These determinants include a lower leverage, a recent certification by financial 
intermediaries, and operational differences such as higher levels of knowledge capital.  The 
paper finds that incumbent firm performance and survival are both related to all three 
determinants.  In what follows, we will briefly describe each determinant of competitive 
differences. 
First, as a direct consequence of the IPO, the offering recapitalizes the issuing firm in 
a way that generally results in a low debt to equity ratio.  Low leverage may give issuing 
firms an advantage over their more highly leveraged competitors by allowing them more 
flexibility in their investments.  This effect has been documented empirically in two earlier 
papers outside the IPO literature.  Chevalier (1995) finds an increased incidence of exits of 
highly leveraged supermarkets.  Similarly, Phillips (1995) finds that output is negatively 
associated with debt levels in three industries.  To the extent that IPOs are less highly 
leveraged than their industry competitors, leverage is expected to be an advantage for IPO 
firms. 
Second, issuing firms have the advantage of being recently certified by investment 
banks.  Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) suggest that firms prefer to be underwritten by 
highly regarded investment banks.  The certification role of these investment banks plays a 
part in investors’ willingness to purchase new issues.  Investors rely on the repeated 
interactions of these banks with issuers, and investors rely on their ability to reject 
underwritings for issuers with low quality.  In other words, firms underwritten by top 
investment banks have been selected because of their potential for success.  
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Third, new entrants are likely to have some non financial advantage over incumbents; 
otherwise the issuing firm would have had difficulty raising new capital.  An example of 
business advantage is knowledge capital as described in Cockburn and Griliches (1988).  
Cockburn and Griliches (1988) study the effectiveness of patents in protecting knowledge 
capital developed through research and development: knowledge capital which gives the firm 
a competitive advantage.  A non financial advantage can be thought of more generally as any 
product, marketing scheme or innovation that gives the new issuing firm some advantage 
over incumbent industry competitors.  
The results in this paper are consistent with all of these hypotheses.  Controlling for a 
number of other factors, we document that incumbent companies show relatively good 
operating performance after large IPOs if they are less leveraged, if their IPO has been 
underwritten by an investment bank with high reputation, and if they spend more money on 
research and development.  The paper documents that these factors also affect an incumbent 
company’s probability of survival for a period of three years after the IPO. 
The results in this paper are related to Braun and Larrain (2006) who document larger 
IPO price declines for incumbent firms with high correlations to the industry in which the 
IPO takes place.  Braun and Larrain (2006) focus on the supply effects of IPOs on existing 
firms by studying large IPOs in emerging markets.  Our paper focuses on the more liquid U.S. 
market, and it focuses on the competitive effect of IPOs.  While Braun and Larrain (2006) 
argue that incumbent price declines are a result of an increase in supply of shares for 
investors, we argue that incumbent price declines are a result of their competitive 
disadvantage.  
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The balance of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section I reviews the relevant 
literature.  Section II provides a description of our data sources and sample construction, and 
Section III characterizes our findings.  Section IV concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This paper is related to different strands of the IPO and more generally corporate 
finance literature that analyze the determinants for the long run performance and 
competitiveness of issuing companies.  
A number of papers analyze the certification effect of investment banks and venture 
capitalists in the IPO process.  Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) 
document that companies experience less underpricing and a better long term performance, 
respectively, if their IPO is underwritten by an investment bank with a high reputation.  
Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that 
venture backed IPOs are less underpriced.  More recently, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2003) find that underpricing decreases with the VC ownership in a firm.  Jain and Kini 
(1995) show that venture backed firms exhibit superior operating performance after they go 
public.  This is consistent with Hellmann and Puri (2002) who show that companies with 
venture capitalist owners are faster in professionalizing their operations and organizational 
structures. 
There is a long lasting debate about the long run performance of companies after their 
IPOs.  A first strand of this literature considers companies’ stock returns in a period of three 
to five years after the IPO.  Ritter (1991) and Ritter and Loughran (1995) document a 
significant underperformance for IPO and SEO companies over this period.  These results 
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have been the starting point for a lively academic debate that focuses on their determinants; 
see for example Barber and Lyon (1996).  A second strand of this literature considers the 
companies’ operating performance before and after the IPO.  Jain and Kini (1994) document 
a significant decline in their post IPO operating performance.  Loughran and Ritter (1997) 
find consistent evidence for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).  Teoh, Welch, and Wong 
(1998) show that firms with more extensive use of accruals perform worse subsequent to 
SEOs.  This paper adds a new dimension to the existing literature by not only considering the 
operating performance of the issuing company, but by also analyzing the impact of the IPO 
on the operating performance of industry competitors.  
The paper is also related to the strand of the literature that analyzes the determinants 
for a company’s competitiveness, in particular with respect to its capital structure.  Chevalier 
(1995) and Philipps (1995) show that companies with higher leverage are less competitive.  
Zingales (1998) analyzes the survival probabilities of companies in the trucking industry and 
shows that a company’s leverage and profitability are significant determinants for its 
continued existence.  Campello (2003) analyzes the impact of leverage on companies’ 
competitiveness across different business cycles.  The competitiveness is measured by the 
change in sales over time, which is also used as one of the key variables in this paper. 
Finally, the paper is related to recent evidence for less integrated markets.  Braun and 
Larrain (2006) analyze the effect of IPOs on other companies in the same or similar 
industries in 22 emerging countries.  They show that the introduction of new assets in the 
form of an IPO depresses the stock prices of closely related assets.  While their paper focuses 
on the impact of asset supply on the cross section of stock prices in these markets, our paper 
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considers stock price reactions in the U.S. market where demand and supply for individual 
financial assets are likely to be far more elastic. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
The IPO data come from the SDC New Issues Database.  The sample in this paper 
comprises all non financial firms that go public between 1980 and 2004 that have both CRSP 
and Compustat data. Since the literature has documented some data issues with the SDC 
database, we validate the key variables, such as the date of the IPO and the SIC codes, by 
confirming values with the CRSP and Compustat database22. The final sample includes 4,188 
IPO firms in 68 two digit SIC industries.  In many cases, there is more than one IPO in a 
given year for an industry.  To study the effect of IPOs on their incumbent competitors, we 
must select IPOs in a given industry to be identified as events.   In most industries, the choice 
is not obvious because there are IPOs in many years, and our annual data will not allow us to 
measure the short term effects of all of the individual issuances. 
We therefore identify the IPOs events by choosing only those IPOs that are not 
preceded or followed by a larger IPO in the same two digit SIC industry in the three years 
before or three years after the IPO date.  We choose IPO proceeds as our measure of size.  
This procedure is chosen to rule out the case of choosing a relatively small IPO for the event.  
As an illustration, assume we were to choose a relatively small IPO as an event. If a larger 
firm went public during our measurement period, the effect of our chosen event on 
incumbent firms would be difficult to measure because it would be dominated by the effect 
of the larger IPO.  We obtain 135 IPO events following this selection criterion. 
                                                 
22 For a detailed description, please see Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). 
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Our identification of IPO events has several advantages and disadvantages.  One 
advantage is the maximum use of data.  By selecting any IPO without larger IPOs in the 
surrounding years, we are using all IPOs that have an uncontaminated measurement period.  
Similarly, by selecting IPOs based on their size relative to other IPOs, we do not impart any 
bias that could arise by selecting IPOs from arbitrarily defined periods of time.  Furthermore, 
the IPO events chosen using this method are spread relatively evenly across the years in our 
sample.  In Table 12, we see that there are at most 14 IPO events in any given year.  
Furthermore, even though the value of IPOs has increased through time, there are IPOs that 
are large relative to IPOs in surrounding years throughout the time span.  We have a fairly 
evenly distributed set of IPO events in early years and later years; there are 54 IPO events 
form 1981 to 1990 and 71 events from 1991 to 2000.   
However, the distribution of IPO events is not perfectly even.  The selection 
methodology ends up with a sample of IPO events that is mildly clustered in “hot” IPO 
markets as defined by Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994).  The hottest IPO years in our 
study, 1983, 1986 and 1996, have a relatively large number of IPO benchmark events, but 
there are also a large number of IPO benchmark events in the cold IPO markets of 1988-1990 
and 2001.  The time series correlation between the number of IPO benchmark events each 
year and the number of IPOs each year is 0.44, which is significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level but not at the 5% level.  Furthermore, to address concerns about the correlation 
between IPO market underpricing and industry performance confounding our results, we 
control for IPO underpricing in our main results.  
We identify the incumbent firms associated with the IPO events in Compustat using 
two-digit SIC codes.  We further restrict the incumbent firms in our sample to be publicly 
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listed at least three years before the IPO event year so that we can observe the difference in 
performance of the incumbent firms before and after the IPO event.  The final sample 
contains 9,494 incumbent firms. 
 The accounting information on both the IPO event firms and the incumbent firms 
comes from Compustat.  In order to investigate the impact of the IPO events on the survival 
of the incumbent firms, we obtain the firm delisting information from CRSP, including the 
delisting date and the reason of being delisted.  We define incumbent firms as “non 
surviving” if the firm is delisted within three years after the IPO event for reasons other than 
merger and acquisition. 
To test the certification hypothesis, we obtain the identity of underwriters in the 
incumbent firms’ most recent equity issuance from both the SDC New Issues and Venture 
Xpert database.  We then obtain underwriter ranking data from Jay Ritter’s website.  Finally, 
venture backing comes from both the SDC New Issues and Venture Xpert database. 
Table 13 provides descriptive statistics for both IPO and incumbent firms.  The 
results suggest that the IPO firms are significantly larger than the incumbent firms and are 
brought to market by underwriters with a higher reputation.  These results are a consequence 
of our sample selection criterion that focuses on IPOs that are large relative to other industry 
IPOs.  Assets and market cap are also larger for the IPOs than for the incumbent firms, but 
the difference is not statistically significant.  
Table 14 introduces and explains all of the variables that are used in this paper.  The 
table provides correlation coefficients between the different variables. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
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4.1. Univariate Results 
Table 15 shows performance statistics for incumbent firms before and after IPO 
events.  We find that the performance of incumbent firms is significantly lower after IPO 
events.  First, we find that firms earn less on existing assets.  In Panel A of Table 15, we find 
that the ratio of net income to assets, ROA1, declines significantly from 3.18% to 0.73% after 
the IPO event.  Similarly, we find that the ratio of operating income to assets, ROA2, declines 
significantly from 11.61% to 8.87%.  We also find that firms invest less; Asset Growth 
declines significantly from 18.02% to 9.59%.  Leverage increases for incumbent firms; the 
interest coverage ratio decreases from 2.92 to 2.04, and the ratio of debt to assets, leverage 
ratio, increases from 0.12 to 0.13.  There is also a significant increase in the Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) index of financial constraints.   
 We can go a step further by exploring the performance of firms that are delisted 
within three years of an IPO event.  We find that these non surviving firms show similar 
patterns to those described above, but the magnitude of the measured performance decreases 
is larger.  For example, Panel B of Table 15 shows that ROA1 decreases by 1.89% for 
surviving firms, and it decreases by 15.23% for delisting firms.  It is also interesting to point 
out that there is no significant increase in the leverage ratio for surviving firms, but non 
surviving firms significantly increase their ratio of debt to assets from 0.10 to 0.18.  In other 
words, the significant increase in leverage in the pooled sample is driven by the non 
surviving sub sample of incumbent firms. 
4.2. Short-Term Price Reaction 
One further piece of evidence for the competitive effect of large IPOs can be obtained 
by analyzing the stock returns of their competitors at and around the IPO date.  The 
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competitors are defined again as those companies that operate in the same industry as the 
IPO firm and are publicly listed as of three years before the IPO date.  The stock price 
response of these firms is analyzed in an event study with different event windows.  The 
results are reported in Table 16. 
In Panel A, market adjusted stock price responses are analyzed for all firms that 
operate in the same industry as the IPO firms.  The total sample amounts to 8,939 incumbent 
firms.  The results suggest that stock prices for these firms drop consistently when a large 
IPO occurs in the same industry.  This holds not only for the immediate period surrounding 
the IPO, but also for a substantial period before and after the IPO.  The first row of Panel A 
shows that the mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the period between 10 days before 
and 10 days after the IPO amounts to -2.22% and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
This negative stock price response can also be observed in the time periods that proceed and 
follow this 20 day window around the IPO date.  The result in the second row shows that the 
stock return in the period between 30 and 11 days before the IPO amounts to -1.35% and it is 
again significant at the 1% level.  The same holds for the 20 day period between 11 and 30 
days after the IPO and the 60 day window between 31 and 90 days after the IPO.  The stock 
returns are again economically and statistically highly significant.  These results suggest that 
industry incumbents suffer a drop in their share price when a large IPO in their industry 
occurs. 
Panel A does not consider the possibility that returns could be mainly driven by the 
stock returns of incumbent firms in a very small number of IPOs.  While this is unlikely 
given the large number of sample companies and the fact that the maximum number of 
incumbents is 1,558, we can mitigate the concern by attributing equal weight to each of the 
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134 sample IPOs.  This is done by first forming a portfolio of returns of the incumbent 
companies for each of the given IPOs and then averaging these portfolio returns across all the 
IPOs.  The results are reported in Panel B, and they suggest that the returns are still negative 
and both economically and statistically significant.  The average 20 day window return 
around the 134 sample IPOs amounts to -2.22% and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
The same holds for the returns over the other return windows.  The returns in a substantial 
period of time before and after the IPOs stay negative and significant and are of similar 
magnitude as those in Panel A.  This rules out the possibility that the results are driven by 
IPO specific determinants, and stresses the generality of the observed pattern.  Taken 
together, the results suggest that incumbent firms suffer stock price drops at and around large 
IPOs in the same industry. 
These results are consistent with the idea of IPO firms competing successfully against 
incumbent firms.  In what follows, we will attempt to describe the cross sectional 
characteristics of incumbent performance declines in a regression setting that allows us to 
control for mitigating factors. 
4.3. Regression Analysis 
4.3.1. Leverage 
One of the potential mechanisms behind poor incumbent performance is leverage.  
Incumbent firms may be less able to compete with their IPO competitors because incumbent 
firms have a higher degree of leverage.  This story is supported in empirical work such as 
Chevalier (1995) and Phillips (1995).  In our study, leverage may play an important role 
because IPOs give issuing firms new equity which reduces the newly listed firm’s leverage. 
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 We define Leverage Ratio as the average debt to assets ratio in the four years 
preceding the IPO.  We find that there is a negative and statistically significant coefficient of 
-0.5213 in Model 9 of Table 17 on Leverage Ratio which indicates that incumbent firms with 
high levels of leverage have poor performance around the introduction of IPO shares.  The 
fact that highly leveraged incumbents perform badly with respect to their less leveraged 
counterparts is consistent with Chevalier (1995) and Phillips (1995), and it serves as one of 
the reasons why IPOs perform better than their incumbent industry competitors. 
 In addition to measuring leverage, we can also look at the availability of public debt 
financing to incumbent firms.  Since some firms may be highly leveraged because they have 
optimally chosen to take advantage of a high debt capacity, we need to look at the ability to 
repay debt in addition to the level of debt.  We use two proxies of debt capacity: the 
existence of bond ratings and whether bond rankings are good.  Bondrankyes is defined as a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if an incumbent firm has a bond ranking and zero 
otherwise.  We see that the existence of a bond ranking has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of 0.2638 in Model 9 of Table 17.  The coefficient estimate indicates 
that firms that have been rated by the ratings agencies perform significantly better than their 
unrated peers.  Since we know that ratings existence is correlated with size (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.49 in Table 3), the existence of a bond rating may be serving as a measure of 
financial flexibility, and this flexibility allows rated firms to perform better than other firms.  
We also construct a measure of debt capacity based on whether bond rankings are good.  We 
define Good Bondrank as an indicator variable that takes the value one if the firm’s bond 
ranking is BBB or above.  Not surprisingly, we find that Good Bondrank is also related to 
firm performance; the statistically significant coefficient estimate of 0.2895 in Model 3 of 
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Table 17 indicates that well ranked firms perform better than other firms around IPO event 
dates.  As with Bondrankyes, Good Bondrank is indicating debt capacity that allows well 
rated firms to compete relatively well against IPO firms.    
4.3.2. Certification 
As suggested by Chemmanur and Fulgheri (1994) and others, part of the value 
underwriters add to new issues is certification.  IPO firms underwritten by top investment 
banks have been certified to an extent not matched by any incumbent firm.  The certification 
may allow IPO firms to obtain inexpensive equity capital, and it may give the IPO firms 
operational advantages. 
 To test whether certification plays a role in the performance of incumbent firms, we 
need to measure the certification quality difference between IPO firms and their incumbent 
competitors.  We construct the variable High UW Rank as an indicator variable that takes the 
value one if an incumbent firm’s equity was underwritten by an investment back with a 
Carter and Manaster (1990) ranking of nine or above.  The statistically significant coefficient 
estimate of 0.13529 in Model 10 of Table 17 indicates that incumbent firms underwritten by 
top investment banks perform better than other firms.  The result is consistent with the idea 
that firms underwritten by top investment banks have a certification that gives them a 
performance advantage over other firms.  In addition to measuring underwriter reputation, we 
use venture capital backing as an alternate means of measuring the certification effect 
resulting from firms being chosen by financial institutions.  We find that incumbent firms 
backed by venture capital investments perform significantly better than their competitors.  
The statistically significant coefficient estimate of 0.0707 in Model 9 of Table 17 indicates 
that venture capital backed firms perform better than other firms around IPOs events.    
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4.3.3. Knowledge 
 Another possible reason for incumbent performance differences around IPOs is 
differences in the knowledge capital.  As pointed out by Cockburn and Griliches (1998) and 
others, knowledge capital gained through research and development is a competitive 
advantage worth protecting with patents and other mechanisms.  We use a measure of 
research intensity which indicates whether incumbent firms are in the top quartile of 
expenditure on research and development.  The statistically significant coefficient of 0.312 in 
Model 9 of Table 17 indicates that incumbent firms with high research intensity perform 
better than other incumbent firms around IPO events.  We also use an indicator for firms in 
the technology sector, Hightech, to separate the effects of this particularly knowledge 
dependent industry.  The insignificant coefficient estimate indicates that the competitive 
effects in this industry are not different from other effects. 
Industry concentration may also play a role in the competitive effects of IPOs.  
Spence (1984) indicates that industries with high fixed costs of research and development 
may be more concentrated and less competitive.  We measure industry concentration with an 
indicator variable, High HH, that takes the value one if the industry Herfindahl index exceeds 
1800 and zero otherwise.  The statistically significant coefficient of 0.10216 in Model 10 of 
Table 17 indicates that highly concentrated industries perform better than other industries 
around IPO events.  This result is consistent with the connection between research intensity 
and industry concentration in Spence (1984); in other words, highly concentrated industries 
perform better than other industries around IPOs because concentrated industries may be 
more knowledge dependent.   
4.3.4. Controls 
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In all of the regressions we include size, book to market, past returns and firm age.  
Each of these variables may affect firm performance in a way that could confound the effect 
of IPO firms on their incumbent competitors.  Our first control, size, proves to be a 
significant predictor of returns.  The statistically significant coefficient estimate of -0.04832 
in Model 10 of Table 17 shows that larger firms, as measured by the log of book assets, have 
larger decreases in performance during IPO events.  Even though the relationship is 
statistically significant, this relationship does not replace our main explanations for low 
incumbent performance described above.  
Past returns could be an important part of the story if IPOs are more likely when 
industries have relatively high market valuations.  If, as in Baker and Wurgler (2002), 
managers are more likely to issue new equity when industries have high valuations, and if 
these valuations are eventually lower, then we could find an increased likelihood of IPOs at 
the top of the valuation cycle.  Furthermore, given the fact that IPOs are most likely at the top 
of the IPO cycle, we could find that incumbent firms would have better performance before 
the IPO than after the IPO, and this difference might not be related to the fact that IPO firms 
compete with the incumbent firms. 
We control for industry valuation cycles in the regressions by including two proxies 
for valuation.  This first proxy, Industry M/B Ratio, is defined as the median market to book 
ratio of all of the firms in an industry over the two year period preceding the IPO.  In Model 
10 of Table 17 the coefficient of 0.03555, which is statistically significant at the 5% level, 
indicates that the performance of incumbent firms is higher after IPOs when market 
valuations are relatively high.  Similarly, our second proxy for valuation, Industry 
Underpricing, is defined as the median industry first day IPO return over the year preceding 
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the IPO event.  This proxy is meant to capture hot IPO markets rather than valuation with 
respect to accounting measures.  As with Industry M/B Ratio, we find industry performance 
is significantly better in environments where past first day IPO performance has been good.  
In Model 9 of Table 17, the 0.28853 coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level, indicates that incumbent performance is higher after IPOs in environments where past 
industry returns are higher.      
We find that the valuation variables have statistically significant effects on 
performance differences in many of the regression parameterizations, but not in the expected 
direction.  The high performance of incumbent firms around IPOs in high valuation 
environments may be the result of a timing mismatch; it may be the case that industry 
valuation cycles are not perfectly aligned with IPO cycles in the sense that our IPO events 
may not come at the same time as performance declines.  It is possible that the IPOs we 
identify happen during upward swings in industry cycles, and our post IPO measurement 
period is before the decline in industry performance.  For the purposes of this paper, the 
important thing is to rule out the possibility that industry cycles coincide with IPO cycles and 
confound the results.  We find that the effect of IPOs on industry performance is not 
explained by industry valuation cycles.       
We also control for firm age.  As shown in Spence (1977), firms have life cycles 
where operating performance tends to increase at the beginning of a firm’s life span and then 
increase less, or even decrease, at later stages of the life cycle.  The concern for this paper is 
that incumbent firms’ performance is declining in the years measured in our study.  If 
incumbent firm performance declines coincide with our IPO event timing, we could find 
performance patterns that have nothing to do with the fact that IPO firms compete with 
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incumbent firms.  We control for firm life cycles by including the variable Log(Age), which 
is defined as the number of years a firm has been publicly traded.  We find firm age to be a 
significant predictor of firm performance.  Specifically, in Model 10 of Table 17, the 
coefficient estimate of -0.21477, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, indicates 
that performance is lower around IPO events for older incumbent firms.  The result confirms 
the notion of firm life cycles where firms have slower increases in performance as they age, 
but for the purposes of this paper, the important fact is that the other explanations described 
above are still important predictors of performance.  
4.3.5. Performance Measures 
In Table 17, we followed Campello (2003) by measuring firm performance with 
changes in log sales for incumbent firms.  Of course, other performance measures could 
provide additional support for our hypothesis.  In Table 18, we use changes in log industry 
adjusted sales, and in Table 19, we use changes in log operating income.  With some notable 
exceptions, the results form the alternate performance measures are very similar to the results 
in Table 17. 
Results from growth in industry adjusted sales and growth in operating income are 
both consistent with our finding that incumbent competitiveness is a function of leverage, 
certification and research intensity.  Consistent with previous results, Leverage Ratio has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient in Table 18 and Table 19.  Similarly, 
Bondrankyes and Good Bondrank both have positive and statistically significant coefficient 
estimates with the alternate performance measures.  Furthermore, our two certification 
variables, VC backing and High UW ranking, have the same effect under the alternate 
performance measures.  Finally, firms in high research intensity industries are shown to have 
44
   
significantly better performance around IPOs under the alternate performance measures.  Our 
three hypotheses about incumbent underperformance are supported in Tables 18 and 19; 
performance measures other than sales growth support our finding that leverage, certification 
and research intensity affect the competitiveness of incumbent firms around IPOs. 
Even though the alternate performance measures support our main hypotheses, there 
are some differences among the measures.  First, our Hightech indicator variable is 
significantly negative only when performance is measured with income growth.  The fact that 
the regression coefficient is negative with all three performance measures but only significant 
with income growth indicates that performance is only a significant function of this industry 
based measure of the importance of knowledge capital when performance is measured with 
income growth.  Similarly, the effect of industry concentration on incumbent performance 
depends on the measure of industry performance.  In Tables 17, 18 and 19, the three 
coefficient estimates on High HH in Models 8, 9 and 10 are all positive.  But two of the three 
coefficient estimates are significant when performance is measured with sales growth, one of 
the three estimates is significant when performance is measured with income growth, and 
there is no significance when performance is measured with industry adjusted sales growth.  
Performance appears to be a function of industry concentration, but only when performance 
is measured with the non industry adjusted measures.   
One important difference between the performance measures is apparent in the 
valuation and IPO underpricing control variables.  When performance is measured with sales 
growth or income growth, Industry M/B ratio has positive and statistically significant 
coefficient estimates.  This indicates that incumbent firms in high market valuation industries 
perform better than other incumbent firms.  However, when performance is measured with 
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industry adjusted sales growth, we find that Industry M/B ratio has negative and statistically 
significant coefficient estimates.  The reversal in regression coefficient estimates indicates 
that incumbent firms in highly valued firms perform better than other incumbent firms 
nominally, but their performance is lower than other incumbent firms on an industry adjusted 
basis.  In other words, average industry performance is relatively good for high valuation 
industries, but incumbent performance relative to industry performance is relatively poor.  
There is a similar effect for incumbent firms in hot IPO markets as measured by Industry 
Underpricing.  We find that incumbent firms in hot IPO industries have lower performance 
than other incumbents, but we have the opposite effect when we measure industry adjusted 
performance. 
4.4. Survival Analysis 
The previous section analyzes the impact of large IPOs on industry competitors’ 
operating performance and shows that a number of variables have a significant influence on 
performance after the IPO.  The same variables are also expected to have a significant 
influence on the most critical benchmark for a company’s operating performance: its 
probability of survival.  
In Table 20 we ask what determines the probability of survival in the fist three years 
after the IPO.  We conduct as a probit analysis in which the dependent variable is equal to 
one if the incumbent firm still exists three years after its competitor’s IPO, and it is equal to 
zero if the company is delisted.  The final sample amounts to 7,052 companies, but 
information availability on venture capital backing reduces the number of observations in 
some estimations.  As in earlier tables, the explanatory variables are first tested separately 
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before they are tested jointly.  The estimation controls for the return on assets to take into 
account the fact that operating performance may influence survival probability. 
The overall results suggest that the same variables that determine a firm’s operating 
performance also determine a firm’s likelihood to survive the public listing of a major 
competitor.  Model 1 shows that firms are more likely to survive if they have a lower 
leverage ratio at the point of the IPO.  They are also more likely to survive if they have a 
bond rating.  Both results suggest that financial flexibility is important to firms when they are 
faced with the IPO of a competitor.  Firms also have a larger probability of surviving if their 
IPO is underwritten by an investment bank with a high reputation.  This is consistent with the 
certification hypothesis according to which top financial intermediaries only underwrite 
equity offerings of those companies for which they have performed a careful due diligence 
and which they have found to be of high quality.  The likelihood of survival also significantly 
increases for companies that have the backing of venture capitalists before the IPO.  This 
result is again consistent with the certification hypothesis.  It is also consistent with the 
hypothesis that venture capitalists help a start up firm to improve its operational, product 
market, and financial decisions.  This argument is in line with the reasoning in Hellmann and 
Puri (2002).  Model 7 tests whether a company’s survival likelihood increases in its research 
intensity and the result suggests that more research intensive firms have a significantly higher 
chance of surviving than less research intensive firms.  This suggests that innovative firms 
with a high share of new products are hit less severely by the intensified market presence of a 
major competitor.  All of the results from the separate regressions remain significant even 
when the explanatory variables are used simultaneously.   
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The overall results from the probit estimations confirm the earlier results on the 
impact of a large IPO on its industry competitors’ operating performance.  Incumbent firms 
are more likely to survive following the IPO of a major competitor if they have more 
financial flexibility, if they have been certified as being of high quality by financial 
intermediaries, if they have the backing of venture capitalists, and if they are more research 
intensive. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the stock price, operating performance and survival probabilities 
of publicly traded companies after a large IPO in their industry.  The paper shows that 
industry competitors experience negative stock price returns around the IPO and have 
significant deterioration in their operating performance after the IPO.  Cross sectionally, 
companies perform better and are more likely to survive if they are less leveraged, if their 
IPO has been underwritten by a top investment bank, and if they spend more on research and 
development. 
These results suggest that IPOs have competitive effects on other companies that 
operate in the same industry.  The evidence in this paper has implications for investors in 
assessing the risk and return of companies in industries in which there is a high probability of 
new IPO entrants. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample of venture-backed firms that went public between 
1980 and 2004 from the Venture Xpert database.The VC incubation period is the period starting from the 
first VC financing round date to the firm’s IPO date, measured in years. IPO size is the offering amount at 
IPO in 2003 dollars. Underwriter ranking is the Carter-Manaster (1990) ranking scaled from 1 to 10. 
Market-to-book ratio is defined as the market value divided by the book value of common equity. 
Research intensity is the ratio of R&D expenses over sales. Capital intensity is the ratio of capital 
expenditure over assets. Tangibility ratio is the ratio of tangible assets over total assets. Herfindahl index 
of market concentration is the square of sales of the firm divided by the sum of square of sales of the 
industry. All industry median numbers are calculated based on the 4-digit SIC codes at the end of fiscal 
year prior to the IPOs.         
 
  Number of observations Mean Median 
VC incubation period (year) 1502 4.023 3.282 
Age of the firm at the first VC 
financing round (year) 1502 3.985 2 
Age of the firm at the IPO(year) 1502 7.923 6 
Number of financing rounds 1502 4.387 4 
VC investments in the firm 
($million) 1469 35.95 20.20 
IPO size ($million) 1482 51.19 39.56 
Underwriter ranking 1268 7.8387 8.1 
Age of the lead VC firm at the 
first VC financing round (year) 1502 13.2323 12 
Industry median market-to-book 
ratio 1500 2.9378 2.8221 
Industry median research 
intensity 1476 0.21917 0.11624 
Industry median capital intensity 1497 0.0495 0.0446 
Industry median tangibility ratio 1502 0.9837 1 
Herfindahl index of industry 
concentration 1502 0.20676 0.1683 
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Table 2 VC Incubation Period and Investments by Period and by Industry 
A sample of 1,502 venture-backed firms that went public between 1980 and 2004 comes from the Venture 
Xpert database. In Table 2A, the sample is separated into four periods based on the year in which firms went 
public. In Table 2B, the sample is categorized into 22 industry groups defined in Appendix B. The industries in 
Table 2B follow an ascending order of the mean incubation period. In both tables, VC incubation period is the 
period from the first VC financing round date to the firm's IPO date, measured in years. VC investments are 
total amount of VC investments in a firm, measured in thousands of 2003 dollars. 
 
Table 2A VC Incubation Period and Investments by Periods
Period Number of firms
Num. of 
firms (%)
Mean 
incubation 
period (years)
Median 
incubation 
period(years)
Mean VC 
investments 
(thous.)
Median VC 
investments 
(thous.)
1980-1990 342 22.77% 3.37 2.72 18,574.02 8,484.85
1991-1998 697 46.40% 4.58 3.82 26,860.45 16,722.93
1999-2000 381 25.37% 3.38 2.95 59,416.11 41,687.29
2001-2004 82 5.46% 5.03 3.97 77,888.46 49,098.20
Total 1502 100.00% 4.02 3.28 35,951.32 20,199.43
Table 2B VC Incubation Period and Investments by Industry
Industry Number of firms
Num. of 
firms (%)
Mean 
incubation 
period (years)
Median 
incubation 
period(years)
Mean VC 
investments 
(thous.)
Median VC 
investments 
(thous.)
Utilities 11 0.73% 2.41 2.13 26,412.74 19,824.47
Retail:Wholesale 26 1.73% 2.57 1.68 27,118.03 17,338.84
Retail:Miscellaneous 62 4.13% 3.05 2.69 41,108.41 29,262.61
Manufacturing:Transportation 
Equipment 3 0.20% 3.21 1.76 2,258.54 2,366.60
Food 10 0.67% 3.30 2.95 10,325.30 6,983.84
Transportation 25 1.66% 3.36 2.29 92,830.37 31,358.92
Mining/Construction 3 0.20% 3.40 1.32 50,189.20 50,189.20
Insurance/RealEstate 9 0.60% 3.50 3.42 32,587.67 14,805.61
Manufacturing:Rubber and 
glass,etc 4 0.27% 3.59 2.04 10,989.14 9,963.58
Other 10 0.67% 3.65 3.73 32,324.97 18,085.10
Services 137 9.12% 3.72 2.84 21,717.37 19,954.84
Textiles/Print/Publish 12 0.80% 3.88 2.68 35,700.88 20,040.11
Computers 647 43.08% 3.92 3.13 23,653.80 16,525.14
Retail:Restaurant 18 1.20% 4.00 2.99 35,951.32 20,199.43
Financial 33 2.20% 4.04 3.47 44,662.16 13,315.04
Extractive 10 0.67% 4.08 2.67 23,951.09 14,527.05
Pharmaceuticals 188 12.52% 4.40 3.90 43,710.01 30,886.66
Manufacturing:Machinery 27 1.80% 4.52 2.95 21,447.13 10,898.84
Manufacturing:Instruments 165 10.99% 4.53 3.86 27,002.83 17,926.34
Manufacturing:Electrical 
Equipment 88 5.86% 4.79 4.26 41,432.01 20,356.78
Manufacturing:Miscellaneous 3 0.20% 4.89 2.43 28,527.03 22,062.20
Manufacturing:Metal 5 0.33% 5.51 3.50 14,740.62 8,311.92
Chemicals 6 0.40% 7.02 6.76 31,472.70 27,053.94
Total 1502 100.00% 4.02 3.28 35,951.32 20,199.43  
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 Table 6A VC Incubation Period and Post-IPO Firm Survival: Univariate Analysis 
The sample includes 1456 venture-backed firms that have delisting information in CRSP. Non-survivors are 
those firms that are delisted within 3 years after the IPOs for reasons other than mergers and acquisitions (CRSP 
delisting code greater than 300). The VC incubation period, firm age at first VC investment date, and firm age 
at IPO are measured in years.     
Survivors Non-survivors T-test
Number of observations 1168 288
Mean (Median) VC 
incubation period 4.15 (3.36) 3.63 (2.82) 2.53**
Mean (Median) Firm age 
at first VC investment 3.97 (1.00) 3.53 (2.00) 0.86
Mean (Median) Firm age 
at IPO 8.05 (6.00) 7.09 (5.00) 1.81*  
Table 6B VC Incubation Period and Post-IPO Firm Survival: A Probit Regression 
The dependent variable is the probability of survival equal to 1 if the firm is delisted within 3 years after the 
IPO for reasons other than mergers and acquisitions. The VC incubation period, firm age at first VC investment 
date and firm age at IPO are measured in years. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate 
significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level. 
 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
-0.429 -0.288 -0.3558
(0.2617) (0.2533) (0.3149)
0.0387** 0.0329**
(0.0151) (0.016)
0.005 0.005
(0.0058) (0.0062)
0.008
(0.0058)
-0.0331 -0.024 -0.02
(0.0415) (0.0411) (0.0444)
0.2159*** 0.1948** 0.1907**
(0.0779) (0.0771) (0.7957)
0.0627* 0.0639* 0.0657*
(0.0331) (0.033) (0.0337)
0.1423 0.1539* 0.1303
(0.0867) (0.0864) (0.0922)
-0.2166* -0.2197* -0.2236*
(0.1176) (0.1173) (0.1209)
0.0009
(0.0391)
0.1689
(0.1085)
-0.4221
(0.2894)
0.0527
(0.1555)
0.0091
(0.1602)
Pseudo R-Square 0.0262 0.0218 0.0302
Number of observations 1187 1187 1167
Early stage dummy
Middle stage dummy
Bubble dummy
Industry M/B ratio
Industry research intensity
Herfindahl Index
Log(asset)
Log(IPO offer size)
Underwriter ranking
Hightech dummy
Intercept
VC incubation period
Firm age at first VC 
investment
Firm age at IPO
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 Table 8 Venture-backing, Firm Age at IPO and Post-IPO Operating Performance 
The sample includes 5,405 IPOs that are originally from the SDC new issues database and are identified by both 
CRSP and Compustat. In this sample, 3,425 IPOs are non-venture-backed and 1,980 IPOs are venture-backed. 
ROA(t) is calculated as the ratio of operating income over total assets t years after IPO. Data on firm founding 
date and underwriter ranking are from Jay Ritter. Log(IPOAGE) is the natural log of the firm's IPO age at the 
IPO. VC dummy is equal to 1 if the IPO is venture-backed. VC*Log(IPOAGE) is the interaction term of VC 
dummy multiplied by the natural log of IPOAGE. Underwriter ranking is the Carter-Manaster (1990) 
underwriter ranking scaled from 1 to 10. Log(proceeds) is the natural log of net proceeds. Hightech dummy is 
equal to 1 if the IPO firm is categorized as high-tech firms and zero otherwise. Bubble dummy is equal to 1 if 
the IPO occurred in 1999 and in 2000 and zero otherwise. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent level.  
Dependent variable: Level of ROA (in percentage)
Variables Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E
Intercept -9.383*** 1.495 -33.587*** 4.833 -35.177*** 5.502 -25.623*** 4.049
Log(IPOAGE) 2.912*** 0.407 3.475*** 1.31 3.1** 1.487 3.535*** 1.082
VC dummy -22.055*** 1.842 -21.752*** 6.011 -31.488*** 6.860 -24.359*** 5.048
VC*Log(IPOAGE) 5.941*** 0.795 6.564** 2.588 9.249*** 2.930 6.826*** 2.163
Underwriter ranking 2.84*** 0.217 3.451*** 0.702 4.287*** 0.793 3.357*** 0.576
Log(proceeds) 0.269 0.434 2.333* 1.399 1.046 1.595 -0.264 1.165
Hightech Dummy -1.14 0.761 -1.832 2.476 -2.114 2.801 -3.108 2.051
Bubble Dummy -21.899*** 1.061 -28.112*** 3.503 -27.728*** 4.019 -13.303*** 2.948
Adjusted R-Square
Num. Observations
ROA(year3)
3074
ROA (year0) ROA(year1) ROA(year2)
0.2327 0.0430 0.0453 0.0513
4222 3963 3525
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Table 12 The Timing of the IPO Events 
Table 12 reports the time distribution of the IPO events.  The sample includes all non financial IPO firms in the SDC 
New Issues database that went public from 1980 to 2004.  We also require the IPO firms be on both CRSP and 
Compustat.  This leaves a sample of 4,188 IPO firms.  We then identify the IPO events by choosing those IPOs that 
are not preceded or followed by a larger IPO in the same two-digit SIC industry in the three years before or three 
years after the IPO date, respectively. 
Cumulative Cumulative
Frequency Percent
1981 1 0.74 1 0.74
1983 13 9.63 14 10.37
1984 4 2.96 18 13.33
1985 3 2.22 21 15.56
1986 6 4.44 27 20
1987 11 8.15 38 28.15
1988 5 3.7 43 31.85
1989 5 3.7 48 35.56
1990 6 4.44 54 40
1991 4 2.96 58 42.96
1992 10 7.41 68 50.37
1993 6 4.44 74 54.81
1994 8 5.93 82 60.74
1995 4 2.96 86 63.7
1996 14 10.37 100 74.07
1997 10 7.41 110 81.48
1998 4 2.96 114 84.44
1999 4 2.96 118 87.41
2000 7 5.19 125 92.59
2001 10 7.41 135 100
Total 135 100 135 100
Year Frequency Percent
Figure 1 The distribution of IPO events over time
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Table 13 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 13 reports the descriptive statistics for both the IPO firms and the incumbent firms.  Assets are the book value 
of assets at the end of the IPO event year.  Sales are the book value of sales at the end of the IPO event year.  
Underwriter Ranking is the Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriter ranking ranging from 1 to 10.  Market Cap is 
the market capitalization at the end of the IPO event year.  Firm Age since Trading measures the age of the firm 
starting from the first trading day in CRSP to the date of the IPO event.  Firm Age since Founding measures the age 
of the firm starting from the founding date to the date of the IPO event.  VC backing is the proportion of firms that 
are venture backed.  Assets, Sales, Market Cap are inflation adjusted in 2003 dollars.  *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.  
 
Wilcoxon 
Significance
Mean (Median) N Mean (Median) N
1536.08 946.53
(112.51) (80.04)
1292.78 772.85
(74.21) (72.7)
7.53 6.84
(8.1) (8.00)
1745 1000.7
(101.9) (95.55)
6.85
(3.39)
23.44
(9.00)
IPO firms Incumbent Firms
Assets (Million) 121 9179 
Underwriter Ranking 133 6213 
*
***
Sales (Million) 118 9161 
Market Cap (Million) 55 8946 
Firm Age since Trading 
(Year) 135 9494 
Firm Age since Founding 
(Year)
VC backing (%)
N/A
6085 
115 
***0
24.00% 30.91%
N/A
135 
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 Table 15 Univariate Statistics 
Table 15 reports the univariate statistics.  Panel A reports the median ratios for 9,494 incumbent firms on 
Compustat before and after the IPO events.  Panel B separates the incumbent firms into two groups: surviving 
and non-surviving firms and reports their median ratios separately.  A firm is considered non-surviving if it is 
delisted within 3 years after the IPO events for reasons other than mergers.  ROA1 is the ratio of net income to 
assets.  ROA2 is the ratio of opearting income to assets. Sales growth is the annual percentage change of sales 
in 2003 dollars.  Asset growth is the annual percentage change of assets in 2003 dollars.  Interest coverage ratio 
is the sum of interest expense and the pre tax income divided by interest expense.  Leverage ratio is the ratio of 
long term debt to the market adjusted value of assets (book value of debts plus market capitalizations).  The K-Z 
financial constraint index is first proposed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) who construct a linear combination of 
five financial ratios that measures how financially constrained a firm is.  Following Lamont, Polk, and Saa-
Requejo (2001), we construct a KZ index as: -1.002 * (cash flow / lagged net capital) + 0.283 * (market to 
book) + 3.139 * (long term and short term debt / total assets)–39.368 * (dividends / lagged net capital)–1.315 * 
(slack / lagged net capital).  Higher levels of the KZ index indicate higher likelihood that a firm is financially 
constrained.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * 
indicates significance at the 10% level.  
 
Period ROA1 ROA2 Sales Growth Asset Growth Interest Coverage Ratio Leverage Ratio
K-Z financial 
constraint index
4-Year Average Before the 
IPO 3.18% 11.61% 14.01% 18.02% 2.92 0.12 -1.21
4-Year Average After the IPO 0.73% 8.87% 10.76% 9.59% 2.04 0.13 -0.55
Wilcoxon Test Significance *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Surviving Firms
Period ROA1 ROA2 Sales Growth Asset Growth Interest Coverage Ratio Leverage Ratio
K-Z financial 
constraint index
4-Year Average Before the 
IPO 4.17% 12.90% 13.07% 16.10% 3.60 0.12 -1.42
4-Year Average After the IPO 2.28% 10.56% 11.27% 11.13% 2.91 0.12 -0.94
Wilcoxon Test Significance *** *** *** *** *** ***
Non-Surviving Firms
Period ROA1 ROA2 Sales Growth Asset Growth Interest Coverage Ratio Leverage Ratio
K-Z financial 
constraint index
4-Year Average Before the 
IPO -7.21% 0.10% 22.42% 34.04% -0.87 0.10 -0.19
4-Year Average After the IPO -22.44% -8.43% 6.96% -2.32% -3.65 0.18 1.43 
Wilcoxon Test Significance *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
ROA1 ROA2 Sales Growth Asset Growth Interest Coverage Ratio Leverage Ratio
K-Z financial 
constraint index
Incumbent Firms 0.73% 8.87% 10.76% 9.59% 2.04 0.13 -0.55
IPO Firms 3.17% 11.73% 17.49% 18.58% 2.69 0.12 -0.77
Panel A Performance Measures for All Firms
Panel B Comparisons of Performance Measures between Surviving and Non-Surviving Firms
Panel C Comparisons of Performance Measures between Incumbent Firms and IPO Firms after the IPO events
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Table 16 Abnormal Returns for the Incumbent Firms around the IPO Events 
Table 16 reports the cumulative abnormal returns of the incumbent firms around the IPO events.  Incumbent 
firms are identified based on the same two digit SIC industry as the IPO firms.  We follow the standard event 
study methodology to compute the abnormal returns as the difference between the stock price returns and the 
expected market model returns.  Panel A reports the cumulative abnormal returns of the individual incumbent 
firms.  Panel B reports the group of cumulative abnormal returns of the incumbent firms based on the IPO 
events.  The market model is estimated using one year of daily returns ending 42 days prior to the IPO event.  
Positive: Negative shows the number of positive versus negative price reactions to the IPO event, respectively.  
We report the significance levels using both the t-statistic and Patell Z-statistic.  *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
Days Number of Firms Mean Abnormalreturns
Positive:
Negative
(-30, -11) 8937 -1.35% -1.923 * -5.795 *** 4021:4916
(-10, 10) 8939 -2.22% -3.09 *** -11.37 *** 3799:5140
(11, 30) 8897 -1.28% -1.827 * -7.632 *** 3984:4913
(31, 90) 8834 -3.77% -3.103 *** -12.509 *** 3847:4987
Days Number ofGroups
Mean Abnormal
returns
Positive:
Negative
(-30, -11) 134 -0.77% -1.727 * -2.634 ** 56:78
(-10, 10) 134 -2.32% -5.077 *** -5.618 *** 48:86
(11, 30) 134 -1.53% -3.441 *** -3.982 *** 50:84
(31, 90) 134 -3.37% -4.374 *** -5.68 *** 55:79
T-Statistics Patell Z-Statistics
Panel A
Panel B
T-Statistics Patell Z-Statistics
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 Appendix A 
The Implementation of the Propensity Score Method 
Some empirical problems arise when we compare the initial returns between venture-
backed and non-venture-backed IPOs. First, raw data of non-venture-backed group may not 
be well “comparable” to the venture-backed group since venture-backed firms are 
documented as younger and smaller companies that cluster in a certain geographical regions. 
Another problem is the endogenous choice of VC financing as discussed in the previous 
sections. Both problems could lead to biased estimates of initial returns.  
One solution is to match venture-backed and non-venture-backed IPOs based on a set 
of predetermined variables and then compare the initial returns between these two 
comparable groups. Megginson and Weiss (1991) is the first that uses matching to address 
this issue. They match venture-backed and non-venture-backed IPO based on the same three-
digit SIC codes and closest offering size. Ideally, to yield a better estimate of initial returns, 
more criteria (such as firms’ geographic preferences and firms’ IPO years) need to be 
included in the matching. However, it is more difficult to match firms when more criteria are 
introduced.  
Lee and Wahal (2004) employ the propensity score matching method, first proposed 
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), to solve the problem of high-dimension matching criteria. 
The propensity score method is an example of “nearest neighbor” matching”. It first requires 
the estimation of a probit or a logit model of the endogenous choice model (the dependent 
variable equals 1 if the firm is venture-backed and equals zero other wise) with a set of 
predetermined variables. In the second step, the predicted probability obtained from the first 
step is then used as the “propensity score”, and each venture-backed IPO is matched with a 
69
   
non-venture-backed counterpart with the closest propensity score (the so called “nearest 
neighbor”). The advantage of using the propensity score method is two-fold: First, it maps 
high dimensions of matching criteria into a one-dimensional propensity score. Second, it 
helps solve the self-selection bias by controlling for a set of predetermined variables that 
explain the endogenous choice of VC financing. In fact, the first step of the propensity score 
method is identical to the first step of the Heckman’s two step procedures, the paradigm of 
addressing the self-selection problem. 
Several variants of the nearest neighbor matching are proposed, e.g. matching with 
replacement and without replacement. In the former case, a non-venture-backed firm can be 
matched more than once whereas in the latter case it is considered only once. Choosing 
between these two methods involves a trade-off between bias and variance. If firms are 
matched with replacement, the distance of propensity score between the matched pair 
decreases and thus reduces the bias. However, matching with replacement could lead to a 
loss of information and an increase in variance of the estimates since there are less non-
venture-backed firms selected. This study adopts the nearest neighbor matching without 
replacement but imposes a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance in 
order to reduce the bias while obtaining more information and decreasing the variance.23 
In order to obtain the propensity scores, I download 7,869 IPOs from 1980 to 2003 
from the SDC new issues database. With the help of Jay Rittter’s dataset as previously 
mentioned, I am able to identify 6258 firms in CRSP. Among the 6,258 firms, 2,221 are 
venture-backed and 4,037 are non-venture-backed. I follow Lee and Wahal (2004)’s 
selection of first stage variables such as (1) the natural log of net proceeds in the IPO (2) 2-
digit SIC code dummies (3) the IPO year dummies (4) Firms’ headquarter state dummies, 
                                                 
23 As a robustness check, I also match firms with replacement and obtain similar results.  
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and (5) underwriter ranking in the logit regression. Moreover, I also include a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the firm in the sample is founded after 1980 to control for the 
structure change of the VC industry, as suggested by Hochberg (2005).24 Using these criteria 
in the first stage, I obtain propensity scores for each observation. I then match venture-
backed and non-venture-backed IPOs based on closest propensity scores without replacement. 
The final sample contains 1731 matched pairs of venture-backed and non-venture-backed 
IPOs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Some of the variables are predetermined before the VC financing such as industry and state dummies and are 
good for controlling for self-selection bias. The other variables are controlling for the IPO characteristic to 
make a better match between venture-backed and non-venture-backed IPOs. In the robustness check, I drop 
variables that control for IPO characteristics and continue the analysis. I find similar results.     
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Appendix B  
Industry Classifications used in Chapter I 
Mining/Construction 1000-1999 
Food 2000-2111 
Textiles/Printing/Publishing 2200-2780 
Chemicals 2800-2824;2840-2899 
Pharmaceuticals 2830-2836 
Extractive 2900-2999;1300-1399 
Manufacturing: Rubber/glass/etc 3200-3299 
Manufacturing: 
Metal 3300-3499 
Manufacturing: 
Machinery 3500-3599 
Manufacturing: 
Electrical Equipment 3600-3699 
Manufacturing: 
Transportation Equipment 3700-3799 
Manufacturing: 
Instruments 3800-3899 
Manufacturing: 
Miscellaneous 3900-3999 
Computers 3500-3579;3670-3679;7370-7379 
Transportation 4000-4899 
Utilities 4900-4999 
Retail: 
Wholesale 5000-5199 
Retail: 
Miscellaneous 5200-5999 
Retail: 
Restaurant 5800-5899 
Financial 6000-6411 
Insurance/Real Estate 6500-6999 
Services 7000-8999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72
   
References 
Allen, F. and G. R. Faulhaber (1989). "Signaling by Underpricing in the Ipo Market." Journal 
of Financial Economics 23(2): 303-323. 
  
Alti, A. (2005). "IPO market timing." Review of Financial Studies 18(3): 1105-1138. 
  
Baker, M. and J. Wurgler (2000). "The equity share in new issues and aggregate stock 
returns." Journal of Finance 55(5): 2219-2257. 
  
Baker, M. and J. Wurgler (2002). "Market timing and capital structure." Journal of Finance 
57(1): 1-32. 
  
Baker, M. and P. A. Gompers (2003). "The determinants of board structure at the initial 
public offering." Journal of Law & Economics 46(2): 569-598. 
  
Barber, B. M. and J. D. Lyon (1996). "Detecting abnormal operating performance: The 
empirical power and specification of test statistics." Journal of Financial Economics 41(3): 
359-399. 
  
Barclay, M. J. and C. W. Smith (1995). "The Priority Structure of Corporate-Liabilities." 
Journal of Finance 50(3): 899-917. 
  
Barry, C. B., C. J. Muscarella, et al. (1990). "The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of 
Public Companies - Evidence from the Going-Public Process." Journal of Financial 
Economics 27(2): 447-471. 
  
Braun, M. and B. Larrain (2005). "Supply Matters for Asset Prices: Evidence from IPOs in 
Emerging Markets." Working Paper, University of California, Los Angeles. 
  
Campbell, T. S. (1979). "Optimal Investment Financing Decisions and the Value of 
Confidentiality." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 14(5): 913-924. 
  
Campello, M. (2003). "Capital structure and product markets interactions: evidence from 
business cycles." Journal of Financial Economics 68(3): 353-378. 
  
Carter, R. and S. Manaster (1990). "Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation." 
Journal of Finance 45(4): 1045-1067. 
  
Carter, R. B., F. H. Dark, et al. (1998). "Underwriter reputation, initial returns, and the long-
run performance of IPO stocks." Journal of Finance 53(1): 285-311. 
  
Chemmanur, T. J. and P. Fulghieri (1994). "Investment Bank Reputation, Information 
Production, and Financial Intermediation." Journal of Finance 49(1): 57-79. 
  
73
   
Chemmanur, T. J. and P. Fulghieri (1999). "A theory of the going-public decision." Review 
of Financial Studies 12(2): 249-279. 
  
Chevalier, J. A. (1995). "Capital Structure and Product-Market Competition - Empirical-
Evidence from the Supermarket Industry." American Economic Review 85(3): 415-435. 
  
Chevalier, J. A. and D. S. Scharfstein (1996). "Capital-market imperfections and 
countercyclical markups: Theory and evidence." American Economic Review 86(4): 703-725. 
  
Cockburn, I. and Z. Griliches (1988). "Industry Effects and Appropriability Measures in the 
Stock Markets Valuation of R-and-D and Patents." American Economic Review 78(2): 419-
423. 
  
Cumming, D. and J. MacIntosh (2001). "Venture Capital Investment Duration in Canada and 
the United States." Journal of Multinational Financial Management 11: 445-463. 
  
Cumming, D., G. Fleming, et al. (2005). "Liquidity risk and venture capital finance." 
Financial Management 34(4): 77-105. 
  
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French (2002). "Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about 
dividends and debt." Review of Financial Studies 15(1): 1-33. 
  
Fulghieri, P. and M. Sevilir (2004). "Size and focus of a venture capitalist’s portfolio." 
Working Paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
  
Gaspar, J. M., M. Massa, et al. (2005). "Shareholder investment horizons and the market for 
corporate control." Journal of Financial Economics 76(1): 135-165. 
  
Gompers, P. A. (1995). "Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture 
Capital." Journal of Finance 50(5): 1461-1489. 
  
Gompers, P. A. (1996). "Grandstanding in the venture capital industry." Journal of Financial 
Economics 42(1): 133-156. 
  
Gompers, P. and J. Lerner (1999). "Conflict of interest in the issuance of public securities: 
Evidence from venture capital." Journal of Law & Economics 42(1): 1-28. 
  
Gompers, P. and J. Lerner (2001). "The venture capital revolution." Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 15(2): 145-168. 
  
Gompers, P. A. and A. Metrick (2001). "Institutional investors and equity prices." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 116(1): 229-259. 
  
Grinblatt, M. and C. Y. Hwang (1989). "Signaling and the Pricing of New Issues." Journal of 
Finance 44(2): 393-420. 
  
74
   
Heckman, J. J. (1979). "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error." Econometrica 47(1): 
153-161. 
  
Hellmann, T. and M. Puri (2000). "The interaction between product market and financing 
strategy: The role of venture capital." Review of Financial Studies 13(4): 959-984. 
  
Hellmann, T. and M. Puri (2002). "Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up 
firms: Empirical evidence." Journal of Finance 57(1): 169-197. 
  
Helwege, J. and N. Liang (2004). "Initial public offerings in hot and cold markets." Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39(3): 541-569. 
  
Hochberg, Y. (2005). "Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the Newly Public 
Firm." Working Paper. 
  
Ibbotson, R. G. and J. F. Jaffe (1975). "Hot Issue Markets." Journal of Finance 30(4): 1027-
1042. 
  
Jain, B. A. and O. Kini (1994). "The Post-Issue Operating Performance of Ipo Firms." 
Journal of Finance 49(5): 1699-1726. 
  
Jain, B. A. and O. Kini (1995). "Venture Capitalist Participation and the Post-Issue Operating 
Performance of IPO Firms." Managerial and Decision Economics 16(6): 593-606. 
  
Jain, B. A. and O. Kini (1999). "On investment banker monitoring in the new issues market." 
Journal of Banking & Finance 23(1): 49-84. 
  
Johnson, S. A. (2003). "Debt maturity and the effects of growth opportunities and liquidity 
risk on leverage." Review of Financial Studies 16(1): 209-236. 
  
Kalbfleisch, J. and Prentice, R. (1980). "The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data." 
(Wiley, New York). 
  
Kaplan, S. N. and L. Zingales (1997). "Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful 
measures of financing constraints?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(1): 169-215. 
  
Kiefer, N. M. (1988). "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions." Journal of 
Economic Literature 26(2): 646-679. 
  
Kortum, S. and J. Lerner (2000). "Assessing the contribution of venture capital to 
innovation." Rand Journal of Economics 31(4): 674-692. 
  
Kovenock, D. and G. Phillips (1995). "Capital Structure and Product-Market Rivalry - How 
Do We Reconcile Theory and Evidence." American Economic Review 85(2): 403-408. 
  
75
   
Kovenock, D. and G. M. Phillips (1997). "Capital structure and product market behavior: An 
examination of plant exit and investment decisions." Review of Financial Studies 10(3): 767-
803. 
  
Lamont, O., C. Polk, et al. (2001). "Financial constraints and stock returns." Review of 
Financial Studies 14(2): 529-554. 
  
Lee, P. M. and S. Wahal (2004). "Grandstanding, certification and the underpricing of 
venture capital backed IPOs." Journal of Financial Economics 73(2): 375-407. 
  
Lerner, J. (1994). "Venture Capitalists and the Decision to Go Public." Journal of Financial 
Economics 35(3): 293-316. 
  
Lerner, J. (1995). "Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms." Journal of 
Finance 50(1): 301-318. 
  
Lerner, J. A. S. a. W. W. (2006). "Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices?: The Limited Partner 
Performance Puzzle." Journal of Finance Forthcoming. 
  
Ljungqvist, A. and W. J. Wilhelm (2003). "IPO pricing in the dot-com bubble." Journal of 
Finance 58(2): 723-752. 
  
Loughran, T. and J. R. Ritter (1995). "The New Issues Puzzle." Journal of Finance 50(1): 23-
51. 
  
Loughran, T. and J. R. Ritter (1997). "The operating performance of firms conducting 
seasoned equity offerings." Journal of Finance 52(5): 1823-1850. 
  
Loughran, T. and J. Ritter (2004). "Why has IPO underpricing changed over time?" Financial 
Management 33(3): 5-37. 
  
Maksimovic, V. and P. Pichler (2001). "Technological innovation and initial public 
offerings." Review of Financial Studies 14(2): 459-494. 
  
Megginson, W. L. and K. A. Weiss (1991). "Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public 
Offerings." Journal of Finance 46(3): 879-903. 
  
Michelacci, C. and J. Suarez (2004). "Business creation and the stock market." Review of 
Economic Studies 71(2): 459-481. 
  
Mikkelson, W. H., M. M. Partch, et al. (1997). "Ownership and operating performance of 
companies that go public." Journal of Financial Economics 44(3): 281-307. 
  
Moskowitz, T. J. and M. Grinblatt (1999). "Do industries explain momentum?" Journal of 
Finance 54(4): 1249-1290. 
  
76
   
Napier, A. W., E. and Thompson, J. (2001). "Venture Capital Funded Companies, Incubation 
and Post IPO Market Performance." 2001 Babson College/Kaufaman Foundation 
Entrepreneurship Research Conference. 
  
Neus, W. and U. Walz (2005). "Exit timing of venture capitalists in the course of an initial 
public offering." Journal of Financial Intermediation 14(2): 253-277. 
  
Pagano, M., F. Panetta, et al. (1998). "Why do companies go public? An empirical analysis." 
Journal of Finance 53(1): 27-64. 
  
Phillips, G. M. (1995). "Increased Debt and Industry Product Markets - an Empirical-
Analysis." Journal of Financial Economics 37(2): 189-238. 
  
Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales (2001). "Financial systems, industrial structure, and growth." 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 17(4): 467-482. 
  
Robinson, K. C. (1999). "An examination of the influence of industry structure on eight 
alternative measures of new venture performance for high potential independent new 
ventures." Journal of Business Venturing 14(2): 165-187. 
  
Rosenbaum, P. R. and D. B. Rubin (1983). "The Central Role of the Propensity Score in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects." Biometrika 70(1): 41-55. 
  
Sahlman, W. A. (1990). "The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations." 
Journal of Financial Economics 27(2): 473-521. 
  
Spence, A. M. (1977). "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing." Bell Journal 
of Economics 8(2): 534-544. 
  
Spence, A. M. (1984). "Industrial-Organization and Competitive Advantage in Multinational 
Industries." American Economic Review 74(2): 356-360. 
  
Teoh, S. H., I. Welch, et al. (1998). "Earnings management and the underperformance of 
seasoned equity offerings." Journal of Financial Economics 50(1): 63-99. 
  
Wang, C. K., K. M. Wang, et al. (2003). "Effects of venture capitalists' participation in listed 
companies." Journal of Banking & Finance 27(10): 2015-2034. 
  
Welch, I. (1989). "Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of Initial 
Public Offerings." Journal of Finance 44(2): 421-449. 
  
Yosha, O. (1995). "Information Disclosure Costs and the Choice of Financing Source." 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 4(1): 3-20. 
  
Zingales, L. (1998). "Survival of the fittest or the fattest? Exit and financing in the trucking 
industry." Journal of Finance 53(3): 905-938. 
77
